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Chapter 1 General Introduction 
 
1.1 Problem statement 
 
Zoonotic diseases continues to be the main threat to global health (causing millions of 
deaths every year). It can be transmitted between humans and animals. For example, 
60,000 people pass away from rabies every year. Zoonotic diseases are not only a threat 
to human health, but also animal health and welfare. They cause decreased productivity 
(egg and milk quality and safety), and have an impact on farmers’ income and 
countries’ economies. Moreover, they are of increasing global importance because of 
increased travel and global trade (OIE, 2019). 
Zoonotic diseases are a global threat and the global demand for livestock product is 
increasing. The growing world population and rising incomes increase the global 
demand for livestock and crop products (Steinfeld, et al., 2006 : Tilman, Balzer, Jason, 
& Befort, 2011). Global meat consumption is forecast to increase from 287.4 million 
tons in 2010 to 475.8 million tons in 2050 (Revell, 2015). And global crop demand is 
expected to double (around 100-110%) from 2005-2050 (Tilman, Balzer, Jason, & 
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Figure 1: Meat consumption and GDP per capita from 1964 to 2030 
Source: Bruinsma, 2003 




Figure 1 demonstrates the projection of world meat consumption. The global trend for 
meat consumption has increased since 1946 and this increase is expected to continue to 
2030. When considering in the different kinds of meat product (table 1), the trend of 
poultry meat consumption has been increasing since 1964. And its consumption rate 
per capita will be the highest in the projection for 2030. While pork consumption also 
will increase from 9.1 kg in 1964 to 15.1 kg in 2030. However, the trend for global 
bovine and ovine meat slightly increased. The increasing trend of bovine meat has been 
driven by developing countries, especially the high growth of beef production and 
consumption in Brazil. In the developing countries, China and Brazil have influenced 
the meat consumption trend (Bruinsma, 2003). 
The reasons behind increasing global meat demand are urbanization through population 
growth, changes in the pattern of animal product consumption and income elasticity; 
the demand for meat and other livestock products is at a high level. Moreover, as 
country incomes rise, country livestock product consumption rises immediately (Rae, 
1998 : Delgado, Rosegrant, Steinfeld, Ehui, & Courbois, 1999). Figure 2 and table 2 
demonstrate the trend of meat consumption and GDP per capita on a global scale in 
2013 (FAO, Food Balance Sheets: Meat - Food supply quantity, 2017 : World Bank, 
GDP (current US$) - Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, 2019 : Our 
Table 1: Meat Consumption by type (kg per capita, carcass weight equivalent) 
 1964/66 1974/76 1984/86 1994/96 1977/99 2015 2030 
World        
    Bovine meat  10.0 11 10.5 9.8 9.8 10.1 10.6 
    Ovine meat 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 2.1 2.4 
    Pig meat 9.1 10.2 12.1 13.7 14.6 15.3 15.1 
       Excl. China 9.7 10.8 11.3 10.4 10.3 9.9 9.7 
    Poultry meat 3.2 4.6 6.4 9.3 10.2 13.8 17.2 
Developing 
countries 
       
    Bovine meat  4.2 4.3 4.8 5.7 6.1 7.1 8.1 
    Ovine meat 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.7 2.0 2.4 
    Pig meat 3.6 4.1 6.4 9.6 10.8 12.0 12.2 
       Excl. China 2.1 2.4 2.8 3.3 3.4 4.0 4.7 
    Poultry meat 1.2 1.8 2.9 5.8 6.9 10.5 14.0 
       Excl. China 
       & Brazil 
1.2 1.9 3.2 4.8 5.2 8.1 11.6 
Source: Bruinsma, 2003 
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world in data, Meat consumption vs. GDP per capita, 2019) Countries with high GDP 
per capita consume meat products at high levels (table 2), for example, Germany (GDP 
per capita 42,914.48$, consumption rate 85.94 kilograms per capita) and United 
Kingdom (GDP per capita 37,398.8 USD, consumption rate 81.48 kilograms per 
capita). The highest meat consumer is Australia at 116.23 kilograms per capita (GDP 
per capita 43,118.09 USD). Countries with the middle level of GDP per capita are in 
the middle level of global meat consumption, for example, the meat consumption rate 
of China is at 60.91 kilograms per capita (GDP per capita 11,951.25 USD,), the meat 
consumption rate of Mexico is at 62.23 kilograms per capita (GDP per capita 16,385.06 
USD), and the meat consumption rate of Thailand is at 28.94 kilograms per capita (GDP 
per capita 14,771.47 USD). Finally, Countries with a low GDP per capita consume meat 
products at low levels, for example, the meat consumption rate of Afghanistan is at 
12.33 kilograms per capita (GDP per capita 1,848.7 USD), the meat consumption rate 
of Bangladesh is at 4.11 kilograms per capita (GDP per capita 2,835.77 USD), and the 
meat consumption rate of Ethiopia is at 7.06 kilograms per capita (GDP per capita 
1,325.76 USD). 
Table 2: Meat consumption and GDP per capita in 2013 in selected countries 
Countries 
Meat consumption per capita 
(kilograms per year) 
GDP per capita 
(USD) 
Total population  
Afghanistan 12.33 1,848.700 3,4499,915 
Australia 116.23 43,118.086 23,213,944 
Bangladesh 4.11 2,835.767 154,393,847 
China 61.82 11,951.248 1,359,368,470 
Ethiopia 7.06 1,325.755 88,356,373 
Germany 85.94 42,914.476 81,804,228 
Mexico 62.23 16,385.060 117,478,371 
Thailand 29.33 14,771.467 70,243,267 
United Kingdom 81.48 37,398.797 63,177,406 
United States 115.13 51,003.686 318,497,630 




When considering the trend of income growth and the meat consumption rate from 
1990 to 2013 in table 3, the relationship between these two factors is positive, especially 
in Asian countries. In 1990, China’s meat consumption rate increased from 24.84 to 
61.82 kilograms per capita (249% increase) and income rates also increased from 
1,526.41$ to 11,951.25$ per capita (783% increase). Vietnam’s meat consumption rate 
increased from 15.39 to 55.22 kilograms per capita (359% increase) and the income 
rate also increased from 1,452.88$ to 5,024.44$ per capita (346% increasing). In 
Myanmar, the meat consumption rate increased from 4.8 to 39.03 kilograms per capita 
(813% increasing) and the income rate also increased from 742.97$ to 4,457.9$ per 
capita (600% increasing). Finally, in Thailand, the meat consumption rate increased 
from 23.56 to 29.33 kilograms per capita (124% increasing) and the income rate also 
increased from 6,650.44$ to 14,771.47$ per capita (222% increase) (FAO, Food 
Balance Sheets: Meat - Food supply quantity, 2017 : World Bank, GDP (current US$) 
- Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, 2019 : Our world in data, Meat 
consumption vs. GDP per capita, 2019). 
 
 
Figure 2: Meat consumption and GDP per capita in 2013 
Source: FAO, 2017; World Bank, 2019; Our world in data, 2019 




Table 3: Meat consumption and GDP per capita from 1990 - 2013 in selected 
countries 
Countries 



















China 24.84 1,526.41 45.06 3,700.74 61.82 11,951.25 
Vietnam 15.39 1,452.88 23.6 2,562.1 55.22 5,024.44 
Myanmar 4.8 749.97 9.6 1,306.44 39.03 4,457.9 
Thailand 23.56 6,650.44 26.65 9,189.06 29.33 14,771.47 
*per capita 
Source: FAO, 2017; World Bank,2019; Our world in data, 2019  
 
Considering the meat supply side in particular, figure 3 demonstrates that from 1961-
2013, the development of meat supply per capita over time increased 182% (from 23.08 
to 42.22 kg.), in Africa it increased 141% (from 13.4 to 19.01 kg.), in America it 
increased 146% (from 59.62 to 86.94 kg.), in Europe it increased 163% (from 47.37 to 
77.34 kg.), in Oceania it increased 109% (from 99.95 to 108.49 kg.), in Asia it increased 
611% (from 5.33 to 32.55 kg.) (FAO, Food Balance Sheets: Meat - Food supply 
quantity, 2017): (Our World In Data, 2019). Figure 1 shows that Asia had the lowest 
amount of meat supply per capita in 1961, but the increasing trend is the highest 
compared to the other regions. In Europe, the trend has been decreasing since 1990 
because of ethical and environmental awareness, which is increasing the vegetarian 
population over time (Santini, Ronzon, Dominguez, Enciso, & Proietti, 2017). 
However, Africa shows the lowest amount of meat supply per person in 2013. Oceania 
has the lowest increasing trend, but the amount of meat supply per person has been 
highest since 1961. The reason is that Australia and New Zealand are major world meat 




In 2018, as a result of productivity improvements, good management practices, 
streamlined production processes and new technology, there was an increase in meat 
output quantities in all major regions in the world, the estimated world meat output was 
336.4 million tons, 1.2 percent higher than in 2017. The main region for global meat 
production is Asia. Comparing the various meat sectors, bovine meat output has the 
highest growth (+2.1 percent), followed by poultry meat (+1.3 percent), and pig meat 
(+0.6 percent). The estimated world meat exports in 2018 were 3.8 million tons, which 
is an increase of 2.9 percent from 2017. This expansion generally came from increased 
shipments from the Unites States of America, Australia, Argentina and the European 
Union. (FAO, Meat Market Review , 2019). 
Global meat consumption and the product safety requirements of societies has increased 
in contrast with escalating instability of the global meat market due to animal disease 
outbreaks and human health concerns. Animal disease outbreaks become more easily 
widespread because of increased animal densities and changes in production and 
slaughtering systems (Morgan & Prakash, 2006). For example, in figure 4, since 1961, 
there was a 50% increase in the global average of livestock units per agricultural land 
Figure 3: Meat supply per capita from 1961 – 2013 in different continents of the 
world  
Source: FAO, 2017; Our world in data, 2019 




area, compared to the present (120% in Africa, 40% in Americas, 35% in Asia, and 
20% in Oceania) (FAO, FAO Agri-Environmental Indicators Update: Livestock 
Patterns, 2019). Since 2001, the magnitude and the impact of animal disease outbreaks 
have increased. Animal disease outbreaks cause market disturbances and affect meat 
consumption, trading patterns, meat price instability and livestock industries (Morgan 
& Prakash, 2006).  
This study focuses on the disease surveillance system in Thailand, on one hand as an 
important meat exporter, and on the other as a rather fragile location where animal/ 
zoonotic diseases are concerned. The country is located at the center of Southeast Asia 
and covers an area of 513,000 square kilometers. The population of Thailand is about 
69.2 million. The population growth rate is about 0.2 percent per year over the past 
decade. The trend of expected population growth rates has decreased in 2020. In 2050, 
the total population is expected to be about 65 million. Bangkok is the capital and 
largest city of Thailand. There are 77 provinces which are divided into the four regions; 
Northern Thailand, Northeastern Thailand, Central Thailand and Southern Thailand 
(Country Report: Thailand, 2019). Compared with the other countries in Southeast 
Figure 4: Livestock unit per agricultural land area in different continents of the world  
Source: FAO, 2019 
8 
 
Asia, Thailand’s GPD in 2018 is the second highest in Southeast Asia (504.99 Billion 
USD) (table 4). The highest is Indonesia (1.04 Trillion USD) (World Bank, GDP 
(current US$) - Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, 2019). 
Table 4: GDP (USD) of selected South east Asia countries from  (2008-2018) 
 GDP (Billion USD) 
 Indonesia Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam 
2008 510.23 174.20 193.61 291.38 99.13 
2009 539.58 168.33 194.15 281.71 106.01 
2010 755.09 199.59 239.81 341.11 115.93 
2011 892.97 224.14 279.35 370.82 135.54 
2012 917.87 250.09 295.09 397.56 155.82 
2013 912.52 271.84 307.58 420.33 171.22 
2014 890.81 284.58 314.85 407.34 186.20 
2015 860.85 292.77 308.00 401.30 193.24 
2016 931.88 304.90 318.07 412.35 205.28 
2017 1015.42 313.62 338.41 455.28 223.78 
2018 1042.17 330.91 364.16 504.99 244.95 
Source: World Bank, 2019 
Thailand is a global meat exporter. A world market demand for value-added ready-to-
eat products, especially in Japan, is driving Thailand's poultry meat export to expand 
(FAO, Meat Market Review, 2018). In 2018 Thailand’s meat exports were 1.2 million 
Figure 5: Thai export products to EU in 2018 
Source: European Commission, 2019 
Percentage of Export products of Thailand to EU in 2018 
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tons, 9.3 percent higher than in 2017 (FAO, Meat Market Review , 2019). Thailand is 
an important agri-food exporter to the EU. In 2018, the main export agri-food products 
from Thailand to EU are meat preparations (41%, 1,101.85 million USD or 996 million 
EUR) (Figure 5) (European Commission, 2019). It means that the disease surveillance 
system is very important to Thailand because the effect of animal disease outbreaks has 
a high impact on Thai meat export and the Thai economy.  
In 2005, zoonoses such as avian influenza or bird flu affected people in Southeast Asia 
and the mortality rate of this disease was around 60% (Cheng , 2017). Many countries 
in Asia, including Thailand, suffered economic damages from avian influenza and the 
estimated disease impact on demand and supply in Thailand was 10. 3 billion USD 
(Bloom, de Wit, & Carangal San—Jose, 2005). Modeling research forecasts have 
predicted that between 2 to 7.4 million people worldwide could be infected and die in 
the next pandemic (Cheng , 2017). These forecasts have many implications for societies, 
including economic losses, human and animal health problems, and food insecurity. 
























Direct costs        
Compensation 2,433 1,183 n.a. 2,223 377 0.5 188 
Control measures n.a. 138 20 1,335 66 14.5 66 
Sub-total 2,433 1,321 20 3,558 433 15 254 
Indirect costs        
Agricultural sector  n.a. 423 n.a. 489 n.a. n.a. 2,202 
Related industries  n.a. 596 60 267 n.a. n.a. 3,212 
Other  n.a. n.a. n.a. 4,890 n.a. n.a. 949 
Sub-total  1,395  1,019  60  5,646  n.a.  n.a.  6,363 
Total costs  3,828  2,340  80  9,204  433  15  6,617 
Impact on GDP  – 0.4%(a)  – 0.75%  n.a.  – 0.2%(b)  n.a.  n.a.  –0.64% 
Cost to public sector  63.5%  43.5%  25.0%  38.6%  n.a. n.a.  3.8% 
Cost to private sector  36.5%  56.5%  75.0%  61.4%  n.a.  n.a.  96.2% 
a) – 0.1% to – 0.2% if the cost of compensation, which accounts for 64% of total costs, is excluded 
b) the impact on United Kingdom (UK) gross domestic product (GDP) is relatively low because the 
cancellation of tourism and leisure to the countryside (53% of total costs), was largely offset by increased 
consumer spending in other sectors of the UK economy  
BSE: bovine spongiform encephalopathy  
CSF: classical swine fever  
n.a.: not available 




The future continues to be uncertain in regard to such pandemics, because vaccines for 
humans, such as those for influenza or avian influenza, are still under development 
(WHO, Influenza, 2017). 
The incidents of animal diseases in the agricultural sector relate to prevention and 
control costs. In table 5, foot and mouth disease cost 80 million US$ for Uruguay in 
2000 and 2001, 9,204 million US$ for the UK in 2001, 433 million US$ for Korea in 
2000, 15 million US$ for Japan in 2000, and 6,617 million US$ for Taipei in 1997 
(FAO, Animal diseases: implications for international meat trade, 2002). The animal 
disease outbreaks can also have an effect on Thai’s meat exports and food security.  
In 2004, there were official reports of the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) 
spreading widely across Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam. The effects of the disease 
were multi-dimensional. First, the mortality rate of the infected flock was higher than 
50%. Second, in Asia, there were 41 deaths and 67 confirmed human cases. Finally, the 
infection affected other livestock species, such as ducks and geese. Especially in 
Thailand, 93% of farms were infected in the central and northern region of the country. 
Ang Thong, Kanchanaburi and Uthaithani were the most highly impacted provinces 
(table 6) (Rushton, Viscarra, Guerna Bleich, & Mcleod, 2005). 
At a farm level, animal diseases can contribute to an increase in the farm’s vulnerability. 
Hence, we not only need better vaccines against viruses, but also a rapid alert system 
for early detection, so that the spread of the pathogen can be controlled before it causes 
a pandemic. In 2019, FAO, WHO, and OIE have launched a guide for countries to 
prevent and control zoonotic diseases, and a surveillance system is one of focal points. 
There are six elements in the guide: 1) strategic planning and emergency preparedness, 
2) surveillance and information sharing, 3) coordinated investigation and response, 4) 
joint risk assessment for zoonotic disease threats, 5) risk reduction, risk communication, 
and community engagement, and 6) workforce development (OIE, 2019). The objective 
of surveillance and information sharing is for multi-coordinators to organize a national 
surveillance system for early and timely zoonotic disease detection and to make data 
sharing routine among all coordinators. The results of the surveillance system and early 
warning system can be used to understand zoonotic diseases and monitor trends (FAO, 
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OIE, & WHO, 2019). Therefore, the disease surveillance system is an important part of 
diseases controlling. It includes reporting the disease or events, analyzing the data, 
responding to those events, and implementing measures aimed at prevention and 
control. 
 
1.2 Digital disease surveillance systems and human behavior 
The internet is now a part of daily life that many people and organizations would find 
it unthinkable to work and live without it (Graham & Dutton, 2014). In the case of 
disease surveillance systems, the internet and digital technology have been used for 
data collection and management during the present epidemic situation. These make for 
a more convenient and faster service system. This section demonstrates and compares 
two types of disease surveillance systems (passive and active disease surveillance 
systems), including digital disease surveillance systems. 
Passive surveillance is the system by which veterinary authorities obtain the data on 
animal diseases. The role of veterinary authorities in passive surveillance systems is as 
Table 6: Regions and provinces affected in the epidemiological week ending 
January 30, 2004 in Thailand. 
 
Region Province 
Farms Farms depopulated 
Affected 
% of national 
total 
Total 
% of farms 
affected 
Central Ang Thong 1,313 19.3 287 21.9 
Central Bangkok 73 1.1  0.0 
Central Chainat  2 0.0 2 100.0 
Central Kanchaburi 2,863 42.1 1,892 66.1 
Central Ratchburi 15 0.2 9 60.0 
Central Singburi 45 0.7 7 15.6 
Central Suphanburi   0.0 850  
Central  4,311 63.4 3,047 70.7 
North  Kampaengphet   0.0   
North Phichit  36 0.5  0.0 
North Phitsanuloke  0.0   
North Sukhothai  0.0 2  
North Uthaithani  1,524 22.4 536 35.2 
North Uttadit 477 7.0 59 12.4 
North  2,037 30.0 597  
North East Kalasin  7 0.1 81 1,157.1 
North East Nakhonpathom  242 3.6 10 4.1 
North East Sakonakhon  203 3.0 203 100.0 
North East  452 6.6 294  
Total   6,800 100.0 3,938 57.9 
Source: Rushton, Viscarra, Guerna Bleich, & Mcleod, 2005 
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a data receiver. They do not establish the specific objective and data collection system 
in a systematic way. They only select the relevant data to apply in the animal disease 
surveillance system from their routine work and the reports from farmers or other 
sources rather randomly. For this reason, passive surveillance is inexpensive and is 
commonly used by the veterinary authorities. On the other hand, the role of veterinary 
authorities in active surveillance systems is as a designer and conductor. The active 
surveillance systems need to be designed and conducted by the veterinary authorities 
with the specific objective of acting as a disease surveillance system. The system 
involves spending a great deal of time, labor, and budgetary resources (World 
Organization for Animal Health, 2018 : FAO, 1999). The main difference between these 
two systems is data collection. Active surveillance is needed for more systematic data 
collection, while passive surveillance collects data rather randomly. 
Comparison between passive and active surveillance system by using Strengths 
Weaknesses Opportunities and Threats analysis or SWOT analysis (table 7). There are 
many weaknesses in active surveillance systems compared to passive surveillance 
systems. The main weakness is higher budget consumption because of the specific data 
collection system and veterinary authority supervision. It means that many surveillance 
systems may not be ready because of the budget restriction. However, comparisons 
between resource consumption and the benefits of an active surveillance systems show 
they are worth it. Because presently, there are many threats from faster and wider 









Source: Own analysis of relevant literature sources 
Participatory disease surveillance systems are a type of active disease surveillance 
system that involve public health practitioners providing health and disease data 
together. However, the participatory disease surveillance system is less expensive and 
more flexible than other types of active surveillance systems (World Organization for 
Animal Health, 2018), because it is a very sensitive method which can collect a lot of 
data information in a short time from good collaboration between farmers and animal 
health agencies (Lore, 2009). Moreover, it can also be conducted on a large scale, 
allowing for animal population-based monitoring at a low cost. For the participatory 
disease surveillance system, the key stakeholders are the community who are willing to 
respond rapidly in sharing health data and who are able to provide insight data about 
health behavior (Smolinski, Crawley, Olsen, Jayaraman, & Libel, 2017). In addition, 
digital technology, particularly smartphones allows them to share the data faster 
(Smolinski, et al., 2015). 
 
Table 7: SWOT analysis of passive and active surveillance system 
Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats 
Passive 
 Inexpensive 
 Commonly used 
 Independent of 
data collection 
and management 
 No specific data 
 No specific data 
collection system 
 Lack of linkage 
between partners 
in the system 
 Increasing global 
disease awareness 
 Convenient data 
collection through 
digitalization  
 Faster outbreak 
and wider spread  
 Mutation of 
diseases 
Active    
 Specific data  
 Conduct by 
veterinary 
authorities 
 Specific data 
collection system 
 Linkage between 
partners in the 
system 
 Expensive 
 Not commonly 
use 
 Time consuming 
 Labor need 
 Increasing global 
diseases 
awareness 
 Convenient data 
collection by 
digitalization 
 Many partners 
may not ready 
 Faster outbreak 
and wider spread 




Disease reporting is the first stage in disease 
surveillance systems and subsequently induces 
other processes. It can lead to a major early 
detection and rapid response activity. Therefore, 
the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) 
formally indicated that the OIE country members 
must report their country’s animal disease 
situation in order to guarantee transparency and 
to improve knowledge of world animal health 
(Animal Health in the World – Overview, 2019). 
To confront animal disease outbreaks, many 
related sectors need to collaborate, coordinate, 
concern, and communicate together (OIE, 2019). 
In 2014, the Participatory One Health Disease 
Detection project, or PODD was set up by the 
veterinary inspection authorities to test animal 
epidemic control systems using smartphone applications in the Chiang Mai province in 
Northern Thailand (Figure 6). The PODD project, in collaboration with Chiang Mai 
University (CMU), the Skoll Global Threats Fund, and the Chiang Mai Provincial 
Livestock Office, was a pilot project which involved various parties, i.e. digital 
technology, local government agencies, and community volunteers. A total of 296 
volunteers from 74 local government agencies were involved in the project (Yano, et 
al., 2018). These volunteers play an important role in the PODD system by reporting 
abnormal animal sicknesses and deaths, animal diseases, animal bites, food safety 
issues, human diseases, and environmental problems via smartphones. However, to 






Figure 6: Study Area and Sample 





1.3 Objectives of the study 
 
Animal disease surveillance systems are complex systems due to multiple and 
numerous participants in the system; governments, veterinarians, reporters, information 
technology (IT) developers, and farmers. To operate a functional and sustainable 
system, it needs not only the impact evaluation, but also an understanding of the 
behavior of participants. Understanding the behavior of participants is important to 
manage the required long-term motivation and to produce a precise animal disease 
detection and control system by avoiding the human bias in the process. Heterogeneous 
participant behavior can influence the performance of the surveillance system. 
Therefore, this study investigates behavioral differences as its focus. The main 
objectives of this study are (i) to demonstrate an overall picture of the economics and 
behavior issues of the system, (ii) to evaluate the economic impact of the system on 
farmers, and (iii) to better understand the behavior of participants in the system, i.e. 
between animal disease reporters and farmers, by using the concepts of behavioral 
economics.  
The specific objectives are identified as follows; 
 To evaluate the economic impact of the digital animal diseases surveillance 
system on farmers. 
 To demonstrate the impact of different motivations on animal disease 
reporters with monetary and non-monetary incentives by using the data from 
the PODD project to design the experiment. 
 To present the effect of the socioeconomic factors and farmer bias on animal 









1.4 Thesis structure 
 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. The first Chapter provides the introduction of 
the problems, the importance of animal disease surveillance systems, the overview and 
SWOT analysis of passive and active surveillance system. It also includes an 
introduction to the study area and the importance of meat export for Thailand. Finally, 
this chapter indicates and demonstrates the three objectives of this study and a summary 
of the thesis structure.    
 
Chapter Two provides more details of digital animal diseases surveillance systems and 
a comparison between modern and traditional surveillance systems to clarify the 
advantages and disadvantages of each system. In addition, this chapter provides 
literature reviews of the socioeconomic impact to calculate the impact of the PODD 
digital animal disease surveillance system on framers. Furthermore, this chapter also 
focuses on the motivations of PODD reporters in the digital animal disease surveillance 
system regarding monetary and non-monetary incentives. The behavior of farmers on 
the livestock’s health report is also a focal point. Finally, this chapter provides an 
overview of animal disease control in Thailand. In general, this chapter investigates 
previous knowledge regarding the focus topic and, as a conclusion, demonstrates the 
research gaps. This study attempts to expand knowledge and fill the research gaps. 
 
Following the literature reviews in the Chapter Two, Chapter Three first demonstrates 
the conceptual framework of this study, including the methods and experimental design 
in this study, plus an introduction of the study area and the PODD project. This chapter 
also provides the challenges of doing research on the study area and strategies for 
dealing with the challenges. Statistic methods are also demonstrated and compared and 
their suitability is demonstrated in this chapter to clarify the methodology in this study.  
 
Chapter Four presents the results over the three parts, which are (i) changes after the 
PODD project focusing on farmers’ cost for grassland dependent and independent 
livestock, (ii) the report effort of the PODD reporter based on the different motivations, 
and (iii) the optimistic bias of farmers on the livestock’s health report. All of these 
results answer the objectives in this study by using methodologies and statistical 




Chapter Five provides the conclusion and discussion based on the results in Chapter 
Four. The impact of the PODD digital animal diseases surveillance system on farmers, 
the effect of the motivations on report behavior, and the influence of farmer’s optimistic 
bias on the livestock’s health report are concluded and discussed. The impact of the 
PODD system on farmer, the best motivation for animal disease reporters, and the effect 
of optimistic bias of farmers are clarified in this chapter. Moreover, the final chapter 
also presents the policy implications, the contribution of this study, the study’s 
limitations, and the direction for future research. The structure of this study is also 
demonstrated in figure 8. Finally, all figures, tables and appendixes, and referenced are 
























































Figure 7: Schematic demonstration of the structure of thesis 
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Chapter 2 Literature review 
The contents of this chapter give an overview of disease surveillance systems in the 
past and present, the differentiation of human and animal disease surveillance systems 
with the first priority on human diseases. The content also includes theories and articles, 
which were used to study the impact of cost reduction on farmers after adoption of 
digital animal disease surveillance systems following the expectation of the PODD 
project. The theoretical concepts of motivation and human bias, which may effect on 
the efficiency of the system, are also described in this chapter. And finally, the content 
also explains the urgent need for awareness and management to tackle animal diseases 
at a global level and regional level, as well as in Thailand. 
2.1 Digital disease surveillance system 
To reduce the confusion of the word of surveillance, the content in this part describes 
definitions of surveillance to give a clear understanding of meaning, coverage, and 
differentiation between each definition. The first definition of surveillance is the 
“ongoing systematic and timely collection, analysis, interpretation, and dissemination 
of information about the occurrence, distribution, and determinants of diseases” 
(Smolinski, Crawley, Olsen, Jayaraman, & Libel, 2017). Following the definition of 
surveillance, continuity and precision are important elements of surveillance systems. 
The World Health Organization (WHO) has defined the definition of public health 
surveillance as the “continuous, systematic collection, analysis and interpretation of 
health-related data needed for the planning, implementation, and evaluation of public 
health practice. Such surveillance can serve as an early warning system for impending 
public health emergencies; document the impact of an intervention, or track progress 
towards specified goals; and monitor and clarify the epidemiology of health problems, 
to allow priorities to be set and to inform public health policy and strategies.” (WHO, 
Public health surveillance, 2019). According to the definition of WHO, it is not only 
continuous and systematic data collection, but also the presence of a rapid alert system 
and the impact of disease documenting. So, the meaning of WHO is wider and it covers 
the activities after the end of the outbreaks. In this study, the definition of WHO is used 
to study, analyze, and discuss the issue of surveillance systems.   
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Following the two definitions above, the elements of success of surveillance systems, 
whether in human or animal diseases, are continuity, precision, and speed. These three 
elements can lead to an effective early warning and timely response system to reduce 
the impact of the outbreaks. Fortunately, the rapid advances in digitalization in this 
modern day can improve both elements in surveillance systems. Internet signals and 
smartphones are widely used around the globe. The growth rate of smartphone users is 
high compared to the traditional feature phone and the speed of the internet is 
improving. It is not only smartphones or computers but also the other electronic 
products such as lamps, air conditioning, and security cameras which can connect to 
the internet and communicate between one another. Speed, precision, and easy 
accessibility of these technologies can be used to increase efficiency in surveillance 
systems. To provide a clear understanding and the advantages and disadvantages of 
past-present surveillance systems, the next section provides a comparison of traditional 
surveillance systems and advanced surveillance systems in the present day. 
 2.1.1 Traditional surveillance systems 
In traditional surveillance systems such as the number of confirmed cases by the health 
department or government agencies; becoming ill, seeking care, having proper 
diagnostic testing, and being reported, were monitored and used in official reports. The 
problem with traditional surveillance systems is the slow pace of receiving reports and 
breaches in each stage within surveillance system, which can affect official reports. For 
example, illness recognition and reports of ill patients and/or health care providers can 
impact heavily on official reports. The existing surveillance systems can miss a case if 
the patient cannot access public health services or the health care provider makes the 
wrong diagnosis or improperly submits a report. Moreover, the case can be missed due 
to failed laboratory tests or result confirmation. For these reasons, official reports may 
under-report cases in the traditional surveillance system. (Madoff & Li, 2014) 
Disease surveillance before 1994 commonly used the traditional surveillance system 
because of the low cost of data collection and lack of modern digital devices and 
processes; there was no requirement for advanced technology and qualified labor. 
Traditional surveillance systems are a type of passive surveillance system. The data in 
the surveillance systems is collected without any specific requirement of the disease 
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data. The collected data is based on routine official routine work and other sources. The 
weaknesses of the traditional surveillance system, which are the slow pace of reporting 
and missing cases, lead to inefficiency in early warning and timely response. Therefore, 
the capability of the surveillance system to reduce the impact of the outbreaks is not as 
good as it should be. The impact of outbreaks in the past was high due to the slow pace 
of the surveillance system. For these reasons, the capability of the traditional 
surveillance system cannot successfully complete the objective of an up to date 
surveillance system following the WHO definition. This led to the improvement of 
surveillance systems by using advanced information technology. 
 2.1.2 Advanced surveillance systems 
The development and switch from traditional surveillance systems to advanced 
surveillance systems began in 1994, which is the period when internet communication 
became more widely used by individuals. A larger amount of information can be 
transferred more quickly, compared to the past. For example, if the public health 
authority needs to send the official outbreak report to the central government for an 
emergency plan announcement, it might take 1-2 days by surface mail, depending the 
geographical distance. Under other conditions, in the same situation, the public health 
authority can send the report by email, which might take 2-3 seconds. Furthermore, 
when considering the cost of information transfer, the cost via the internet is lower 
because there is no need for the mailman, fuel energy, and travelling time. These are 
the reasons why internet technology and electronic information were widely adopted to 
improve the surveillance systems. On a global scale, the global health of disease 
reporting was changed from the traditional public health infrastructure because data 
about diseases and outbreaks is announced through many online channels by 
government agencies, press reports, blogs, and chat rooms (Brownstein J. S., Freifeld , 
Reis , & Mandl , 2008). 
Attempts to apply internet technology and electronic information in surveillance 
systems increased because it can reduce the weaknesses of traditional surveillance 
systems such as slowness, error, and missing cases. Since 1994, public health 
surveillance has used internet technology and electronic information to reduce outbreak 
detection time and to conveniently prevent and respond to outbreaks. Public health 
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agencies, Global Outbreak Alert, and the Response Network of the World Health 
Organization (WHO) use web-based source data which is not captured by traditional 
government communication channels as sources for daily surveillance activities 
(Brownstein, Freifeld, & Madoff, 2009). 
The capability extension of surveillance systems via internet technology and electronic 
information does not only occur at a national level, but also at a global level. In 1994, 
the Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases, or ProMED-mail was founded, with 
more than 45,000 subscribers in 188 countries (Madoff, 2004). The ProMED readers 
receive outbreak e-mails and post case reports and expert commentary (Brownstein, 
Freifeld, & Madoff, 2009). These were the first efforts to create a publicly available 
reporting system by the International Society for Infectious Diseases (Madoff, 2004). 
The cooperation of 188 countries in ProMED demonstrated that internet technology 
and electronic information can increase the speed and expand the connectivity of public 
health authorities in many countries, instead of individuals work separately. Moreover, 
it reduces the problem of information non-continuity and increases the global 
surveillance system capability to control trans-border outbreaks. The ProMED 
Flowchart is shown in figure 8 and the number of reports in ProMED from 1994-2003 











Figure 8: The ProMED Flowchart 
Source: (Madoff L. C., 2004) 
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(Top Moderator) 
Expert Subject Area Moderator 
- PMm has moderators for bacterial, viral, and parasitic diseases; animal 
diseases and zoonoses; plant diseases; epidemiology and surveillance, 
entomology. 
- Moderators review and investigate reports for scientific accuracy and 
relevance. They also add postscript comments and references. 
Outside Experts 
Moderators may consult 
other experts and external 
agencies for their input. 
Top Moderator 
- Report accepted and reviewed for posting and returned to the Top Moderator for approval and final 
check with the following designations: red, yellow, or green. 
Related reports may be combined into a topic summary 
RED – Urgent report to be 
posted immediately  
YELLOW – Report may or may not 
be urgent: to be decided by Top 
Moderator  
GREEN – Not an urgent 
report; to be finalized by 
copy editor  
Copy editor 
E-mail 
Reports are sent to overs 32,000 
direct subscribers in 150 
countries. PMm has 11 separate 
lists based on interests and 
language of subscriber. 
Web 
Reports are immediately posted 
on the PMm website for public 
access and archived in a 
searchable database. 
1 report 5 reports 
7 published 
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20 potential reports 
10 rejected reports 
30 reposted submissions (daily average) 
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Table 8: Number of Reports in ProMED from 1994-2003 
 
Disease Number of reports 
Dengue 749 
West Nile virus infection 728 
Foot-and-mouth disease 597 
Cholera 578 
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy 578 
Rabies 557 
Anthrax 474 
Ebola virus infection 424 
Escherichia coli O 157 infection 422 
Hantavirus infection 340 




Yellow Fever 265 
Unknown illness  209 
 
Source: (Madoff, 2004). 
Another example of advanced surveillance systems is the Global Public Health 
Intelligence Network (GPHIN). It was established in 1997 by the Public Health Agency 
of Canada, in collaboration with the WHO Relevant articles from the news are retrieved 
every 15 minutes with extensive search queries by the software. ProMED and GPHIN 
became an important tool for providing information about a severe acute respiratory 
distress syndrome (SARS) outbreak or severe acute respiratory syndrome in China on 
November 2002 to public health officials by analyzing informal reports on website and 
chatroom discussions.  
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However, advanced information technology in the present is involved in many 
dimensions of everyday life, especially smartphone technology. Many smartphone 
applications are ready to be downloaded and to be used to make a more secure and 
convenient life. Compared to the feature phone, there are many advanced improvements 
on smartphones such as built-in global positioning system (GPS) to locate the phone 
position, built-in cameras to capture images and record videos, high-speed internet 
access to the website and mapping, and a built-in touch screen instead of a joystick and 
hardware keyboards  (Anokwa, Hartung, Brunette, Borriello, & Lerer, 2009). Mobile 
and wireless technologies can be used to contribute and reform health services 
worldwide. These are new opportunities for integration between the growth of mobile 
phone networks and health services to create eHealth service (Vital Wave Consulting, 
2009). Moreover, in the developing world, many organizations operating need effective 
data collection to successfully reach their goals. Smartphone growth and technical 
progress are chances to improve the weakness of the current health data collection 
method by using wireless technology.  (Anokwa, Hartung, Brunette, Borriello, & Lerer, 
2009). 
2.2 Digital animal disease surveillance system in Southeast Asia 
The birthplace of emerging diseases such as severe acute respiratory syndrome, or 
SARS, and highly pathogenic avian influenza (H1N1) in 2003 was Southeast Asia 
(Horby, Pfeiffer, & Oshitani, 2013 ; Paul, et al., 2010). This region has high potential 
to be the zoonotic origin because of the high diversity of wildlife and microbial life in 
subtropical and tropical climates (Morse, et al, 2012). On the other hand, in Southeast 
Asia, it is easy to find smartphone users who are accessing social media such as 
Facebook or YouTube because more than 600 million people in this region watch online 
videos on YouTube and the number of social media users is growing (Venkiteswaran , 
2019) while the estimated number of global YouTube users is 1.78 billion in 2020 
(Clement, 2018). There are few projects in Southeast Asia which apply the smartphone 
and communication technology to improve the animal disease surveillances in their 




For example, in Cambodia in 2004, a Mobile Reminder System for Cambodia Diabetics 
or MoPoTsyo Patient Information Center was established by Maurits van Pelt and 
Cambodian collaborators. The system provides information and health care for the 
patients suffering from hypertension and diabetes. The objective of the system is to 
provide reliable information to the patients. The patients are volunteers and received 
automatic voice messages (15-20 sec.) daily from Monday to Saturday and a special 
massage for subgroup. Voice messages were used in this system because text message 
did not support Khmer (formal language of Cambodia) fonts and the letters are too 
small on the phone. After receiving the message, patients could reply or end the call 
(Integrating Mobile E-Health into Diabetes Management and Hypertension in 
Cambodia, n.d.).  
Another example in Cambodia is the malaria day zero alert system, which was 
established in 2011. The system was funded by the Malaria Consortium (MC) in 
collaboration with The National Center for Parasitology, Entomology and Malaria 
Control (CNM), CamGSM Co. Ltd. This system uses web-based applications to 
integrate a working system between health center staff (HC) and village malaria 
workers (VMWs). VMWs were trained to use a cell phone and report malaria cases. It 
Figure 9: SMS report training of the malaria day zero alert system  
Source: (Cambodia Malaria Surveillance System, n.d.) 
27 
 
is the duty of VMWs to report malaria cases in provincial villages by Short Message 
Service (SMS) text to alert the system center. After the center receives the report, the 
center forwards the report to the local, which confirms the malaria case. At the same 
time, if it’s necessary, the report will be forwarded to a national level, such as Cambodia 
ministry of health for emergency disease control (Cambodia Malaria Surveillance 
System, n.d.).  
In Thailand, the smartphone application DocterMe was launched in the IOS and 
Android stores in 2001, in collaboration with the Folk Doctor Foundation, Opendream, 
with financial support from the Thai Health Promotion Foundation (figure 10). It is a 
free of charge and accessible application, which is the most popular application in the 
health and fitness applications category in Thailand. The aim of DoctorMe is to increase 
the participation of Thai people in the disease surveillance system and also collect 
health data because of the increasing of technology capacity in Thailand and the disease 
outbreak hotspots in Southeast Asia. This application has been downloaded by 400,000 
users in two years. The number of active users per month is 35,000, mostly in Thailand. 
The application also provides the location of more than 1,000 hospital and clinic 
locations with GPS technology. After an update, the function of user health data 
collection was removed and the application only demonstrates the user searching trends 
of symptom. However, the issue of a user incentive, such as a monetary or social 
incentive for engaging, is very important for the application (Susumpow, Pansuwan, 




Given the success in applying advanced technology to disease surveillance, such as the 
DoctorMe and GeoChat apps, Thailand expanded from human health to animal disease 
surveillance systems. In 2014, The Participatory One Health Diseases Detection or 
PODD was established in collaboration with Chiang Mai University (CMU), Skoll 
Global Threats Fund, and the Chiang Mai Livestock Office. The pilot project was 
started with 74 local governments in the Chiang Mai province. The project aims to 
create an effective animal disease detection system by using advanced technology in 
Thailand. As reporters, the village volunteers had to report the animal disease situation 
in their area via the smartphone application “PODD” on an android system. They were 
trained in how to use the application and the basic knowledge of animal disease from 
the veterinarian in the project. The application has a list of short but important question 
for the volunteers to answer before submitting. The process only takes a few minutes. 
They could also attach photos and a location (GPS) with their report. After the report 
is submitted, the PODD Epicenter receives it and a specialist makes a decision to 
Figure 10: The DoctorMe application on a smartphone  
Source: (Susumpow, Pansuwan, Sajda, & Crawley, 2014) 
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respond to the situation. If the report of an animal disease is confirmed, the alert will 
be sent to the local government and the livestock authorities (figure 11). This project 
has won international and national level awards for health innovations because of the 
holistic approach, community-ownership, and effective response surveillance system 














Figure 11: PODD model 
Source: (PODD, n.d.) 
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Table 9: Comparison of Traditional, Advanced, and Further Advanced 
Surveillance Systems   






1532 - present 
Advanced 
(Email, Web) 





2004 - present 
Ongoing data collection √ √ √ 
Low operation cost √   
Rapidity  √ √ 
Accuracy  √ √ 
Precision   √ 




High technology need  √ √ 
Internet accessibility need  √ √ 
Global scale system  √ √ 
Source: Own analysis of relevant literature sources 
 
2.3 The economic impact of digital animal disease surveillance systems on 
framers 
This study focuses on the impact of animal diseases on farmers, which is one of the 
objectives of this study. The overall picture of the impact of animal diseases can foster 
a clear understanding about the way to consider the dimension of the impact. The FAO 
(2004) states that it can be complex to evaluate the economic impact of animal diseases 
because, in some cases, the effect only appears in the long-term and indirectly to 
farmers. It is hard to precisely evaluate the economic impact, as this depends on 
variables such as the type and damage of animal disease. Considering the type of 
economic impacts of animal diseases, there are six impact types; production, price and 
market, trade, food security and nutrition, health and environment, and the financial 





1. The impact on production 
In figure 12, Farm income is reduced by losing or reducing productivity, which is the 
direct economic impact of animal diseases. The magnitude of this impact will depend 
on many factors, such as the variety of farm income and the number of producers in the 
market. In some cases, there can be a long-lasting impact on a reduction in animal 
productivity or a delay in livestock output/reproduction (hidden number). The 
evaluation of economic impact cannot be calculated easily by multiplying lost output 
by the market price. It should be the same with the economic impact of the damage. 
Adaptation of frames, farm community responses, and market adjustments should be 
considered in the actual economic impact. For these reasons, the lost output may be 
higher than the welfare loss. However, the lost output may less than the welfare loss if 
the farmer or community response is limited and the economy only depends on the 
affected product. 
Drop in domestic prices 
Reduced exports 
Ban or tightened controls by 
importing countries 
Increased prices 




Figure 12: Types of disease impacts 
Source: (FAO, Transboundary Animal Diseases. Assessment of 
socioeconomic impacts and institutional responses. Livestock policy, 2004) 
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2. The impact on price and market effects 
The market supply and demand effects in figure 12 demonstrate that price variations 
can be an economic impact as a result of animal diseases because of demand and supply 
shocks. Wage variations can occur on the farm and process by market effects. 
Moreover, it can affect on upstream and downstream businesses. The elasticity of 
demand and supply are an imprint role to reduce or increase the economic impact of the 
disease. In some cases, health concerns of consumers can lead to a reduction in demand 
and induce lower price. 
3. The impact on trade 
As number 3 in figure 12 shows, the economic impact of animal diseases on trade can 
be higher than the impact on production because in countries which are not infected, 
the disease will seriously control the import of livestock products from infected 
countries, to protect their livestock production. Importation may be very strict or 
cancelled. It demonstrates that farmers or export countries have to be aware of the 
implication of consumer or import countries concerning their animal diseases. 
4. The impact on food security and nutrition 
Figure 12 in the externalities part demonstrates that food security and nutrition in 
developing countries can be significantly affected by animal diseases. Growing 
international trade creates more food variety and reduces the impact of animal diseases. 
However, in low income communities, animal diseases can still have an effect on food 
security because of a lack of food substitution. In developing countries, national policy-
makers are seriously concerned about the food security impact and the need for 
international support for animal disease control. 
5. The impact on health and the environment 
From the externalities part in figure 12, zoonotic diseases increase concerns for human 
health. However, the concern is not only for human health, but also the environment. 
Animal disease can have an effect on domestic wildlife. Moreover, the environment 




6. The impact on financial costs  
As shown in the financial effects part of figure 12, controlling animal diseases normally 
requires a budget. Many necessary processes incur a cost, such as inspection, 
monitoring, preventing, and responding. Governments have to spend the budget on 
these animal disease control processes. In some cases, the level of the animal disease 
control costs is equal to the size of the agricultural sector. The benefit part of animal 
disease control is not obvious, especially in the case of prevention and emergency 
preparedness 
2.4 Reporter motivation in the digital animal disease surveillance system 
Motivation is important for the performance and success of a participatory disease 
surveillance system. There are many explanations of motivation involved in this study. 
Maslow’s theory is the famous theory of human motivation. He separated human needs 
into five levels that motivate individuals to achieve: physiological needs, safety needs, 
belongingness and love needs, esteem needs, and self-actualization needs (Maslow, 
1943).  
However, it is undeniable that today's utilization of money as a motivation is 
widespread. That is because we live in the age of market triumphalism, in which money 
can buy most of our desires (Sandel , 2012). For instance, in the standard labor model 
of economics, human beings as laborers will offer their effort and time in exchange for 
compensation (Snyder & Nicholson, 2016). 
According to the standard labor model of economics, people work more for higher 
wages and work less for lower wages. In other words, if there is no payment, there is 
no effort. However, the overarching question is how should we do this if we want to 
motivate participants in the participatory disease surveillance system? Is money the 
only effective motivation, or is non-monetary motivation even more effective and 
sustainable in the long run? As the participatory system of disease surveillance has 
developed, the outbreak situation of diseases currently has a quite high impact. For 
example, in 2005, zoonoses such as avian influenza affected populations in Southeast 
Asia. Modeling research forecasts have predicted that between 2 to 7.4 million people 
worldwide could be infected and die in the next pandemic (Cheng, WHO Handbook for 
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Journalists: Influenza Pandemic, 2005). These forecasts have many implications for 
societies, including economic losses, human and animal health problems, and food 
security. Regarding such pandemics, the future continues to be uncertain because 
vaccines for humans, such as those for influenza or avian influenza, are not yet ready 
for widespread use. That is because the candidate vaccines are still under development 
(WHO, Influenza, 2011). Therefore, we not only need better vaccines against viruses, 
but also access to a rapid alert system for early detection. So that these issues can be 
dealt with by controlling the spread of the pathogen before it causes a pandemic. 
However, development and application of surveillance systems is an on-going activity 
that must be sustainable and permanently available, so the PODD project encountered 
the issue of how to motivate volunteers, especially in the long-term. 
In this study, we attempt to use the theory of monetary and non-monetary incentives to 
explain the short-term and long-term responses of participants. Monetary and non-
monetary incentives are called monetary markets and social markets respectively 
(Heyman & Ariely, 2004), which is the theoretical framework of this study. This 
concept was derived from the Fiske’s relational models theory (1992). Fiske analyzed 
human relationships by reviewing studies from various communities. The model 
categorizes human relationships into four models; communal sharing (CS), authority 
ranking (AR), equality matching (EM), and market pricing (MP). These four types of 
relationships not only represent relationships in society as a whole, but also represent it 
in a social group or between individuals (Fiske , 1992).  
Fiske compared all of the relationships to a statistical scale for easy comprehension. 
First, CS fits into a nominal scale. People in this relationship are as important as the 
others in the group. People treat each other or a group of people equally and without 
distinction. People think that they have certain characteristics that are related to other 
members in the group and have sympathy for others. Moreover, they can access group 
resources, for example, family relationships. Second, AR fits into an ordinal scale. 
Under this relationship, people in the group are ranked. The lower ranked people must 
listen to the orders of the higher ranked people. AR is a perfect linear ranking 
relationship. Higher ranking people can manage group resources and can give orders to 
lower ranking people, for example, military relationships. Third, EM fits into an 
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interval scale. In this relationship, everyone is under the same rules, for example, sports 
games or elections. EM is a balanced equilibrium relationship. To stimulate others to 
do something, we must do something in return, but not necessarily the same thing and 
the same amount of effort. And finally, MP fits into a ratio scale. Under this 
relationship, people calculate their costs and benefits for every activity. People reduce 
the variety of everything to the form of value and utility. If it is worthwhile, they do it. 
If it is not, they do the other thing. MP is a market relationship involving money, rent, 
wages, or interest rates. To make others do something, we have to do the same thing 
and put in the same effort in return or pay the money back. People in MP relationships 
are highly entrepreneurial and have benefits or profits as key drivers (Fiske , 1992). 
This relationship is what economists use as an assumption for predicting human 
behavior in economic models, which is called rationality.   
Fiske (1992) explained that the characteristic of society affects the relationships of 
social members, for example, in Asia, CS and AR relationships were combined 
together, which Carl Marx called the Asiatic mode of production, and in societies that 
believe in monotheistic religions, there is an AR relationship between God and votary, 
however, modern societies which use the division of labor system demonstrate an MP 
relationship. There were obviously different relationships between societies in the past. 
However, the extension of the market relationship and spread of a market-centric-idea 
has changed relationships in each dimension of life to a market relationship (Sandel , 
2012). It makes the different relationships between societies unclear. 
The four types of relationship do not only demonstrate relationships in an overall 
picture of society, but also in a social group or between individuals. Heyman & Ariely 
(2004) reorganized Fiske’s relationship by combining CS, AR, and EM, and called the 
merge social markets. MP alone was called a monetary market. Under social markets, 
people live in a warm human relationship and focus on altruism. When people have to 
do something, they do not expect anything in return. If, eventually, there is some type 
of return, it does not have to be done immediately, nor does it have to be to the same 
extent. For example, volunteer caregivers work to take care of the elderly without 
expecting them to do anything in return. Many times, volunteers only receive 
gratefulness in return, but it is not equivalent to what they have done. The social market 
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is unclear and indirect in contrast to monetary markets. In monetary markets, people 
calculate the cost and benefits of every action. The return must be straightforward and 
clear without any ambiguity. For example, if somebody needs a caregiver, they have to 
pay hourly compensation. When they stop paying, elderly care is over. Consequently, 
it can be stated that there are two types of markets, not just monetary markets as 
economic theory assumes.   
2.4.1 Monetary incentives 
People calculate the cost and benefits of every action, even the opportunity costs, which 
is the other option loss after one option is chosen. The return must be straightforward 
and clear without any ambiguity and should be dominant over cost. For instance, if an 
elderly person requires attention, hourly compensation must be paid. When the 
compensation stops, the provision of care ceases (Heyman & Ariely, 2004).  
2.4.2 Non-monetary incentives 
Under the social markets, people live in a well-balanced human relationship and focus 
on altruism. People give out their time and energy without expectation of return. If 
eventually there is some type of returns, it does not have to be immediate, nor does it 
have to be equal to the input of time or effort. For example, volunteer careers commit 
to care for the elderly without expecting anything in return. They frequently receive 
only gratitude instead. The social market is unclear and indirect, which is in contrast to 










Table 10: Monetary and non-monetary incentives  
 Monetary incentive Non-monetary incentive 
Norm type Market norm Social norm 
Fiske’s human relationships MP CS, AR, and EM 
Focus of interest Self-interest Altruism 
Mode of thought Cost and benefits 
Well-balanced human 
relationship 
Expectation of return Yes No / maybe 
Quantity of return 
Straightforward, clear, and 
dominates over cost 
Gratitude, not have to equal 
to the effort 
Duration of return Immediately None / not specified 
Example of 
societies/institutions 
Business relationship Asiatic mode of production, 
Military relationship, sport 
competition 
Source: (Heyman & Ariely, 2004) 
2.4.3 The effect of monetary and non-monetary incentives on reporters 
Previous researches demonstrated that in cases where social and monetary incentives 
interact with each other, monetary incentives are more influential. This means that 
social incentives will disappear for a long time, and it is difficult to return to social 
incentives after money incentives are used (Sandel , 2012 : Gneezy & Rustichini, 1970 
: Ariely, 2010).Therefore, when using monetary incentives, we must be careful of the 
consequences, especially in the case of social activities that require volunteer groups. 
It makes them compare their compensation to the normal wage rate and their 
expectation of an equal amount of compensation (Frey & Gallus, 2016). Moreover, 
monetary incentives can reduce effort after the compensation is terminated (Ariely, 
2016 : Lieberman, 2002). In addition, pushing people towards monetary incentives can 
be done easily by making them think about money even though there are no real 
payment (Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2008). Therefore, compensation payment is enough 
to shift volunteers from the social incentive to the monetary incentive. In some cases, 
the exchange of effort instead of the money can maintain the relationship between social 
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markets and monetary markets, but the relationship is more similar to social markets 
(Ariely, 2010). 
2.5 Farmer’s opinion and behavior on livestock health report  
With respect to the economic perspective, people respond to an incentive and make a 
decision based on rational behavior. In the situation of adverse selection in farmers’ 
reports, if farmers are economically rational beings, they must calculate the expected 
cost of the report and respond to the lowest cost option (Wolf, 2013). Focusing on the 
cost of the report, large scale farmers will report lower than small scale farmers because 
their fixed costs are higher (Wolf, 2006). From a rational behavior perspective, this 
means that every farmer has the same way of thinking, which is economic rationality. 
In an uncertain situation, they estimate the animal disease risk in their farms as neutral, 
without bias, neither optimistic nor pessimistic. Following unbiased estimation, their 
decisions to prevent animal disease and report are rational. It seems to be easy to 
understand farmers’ behavior. However, our experience in a study area in which we 
interviewed farmers in Chiang Mai, Thailand showed different behavior. 
In the study of area, we found that farmers' understanding of the situation is different 
from the real situation. In some cases, we found that farmers are less aware of an animal 
outbreak and have confidence that their farms are safe, even if other farms surrounding 
their farm are infected.  This situation reflects the fact that some factors affect the 
surveillance and response to the animal epidemic among farmers.  Even if the bad 
situation such as an outbreak in their farm or abnormal livestock death appears in front 
of them and the veterinarian gives the warning and information they need, they still 
choose to believe that they can control the situation and that the misfortune will not 
happen to them. 
2.5.1 Optimistic bias 
Against the background of the above mentioned reasons, we found that farmers have a 
clearly optimistic bias.  The optimistic bias is the estimation error about the risk of a 
negative event and the probability of positive event.  Persons who have an optimistic 
bias believe that their risk of a negative event is lower than for others and their 
probability of positive event is higher than for others (Harris & Hahn, 2011).  The 
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optimistic bias is widely discovered in psychology and behavioral economics 
documents and about 80% of people have an optimistic bias and its effect spans gender, 
nationality, age and race (Sharot, 2011).  Weinstein ( 1980)  was the first person to 
demonstrate optimistic bias, he called it unrealistic optimism.  He explained that 
optimistic bias is an estimation error about the risk of a negative event, so that persons 
believe that their risk of negative event is lower than for others, and their probability of 
positive event is higher than for others.  The optimistic bias has been demonstrated in 
many circumstances.  For example, people believe that their probability of getting a 
serious illness (O’Sullivan, 2015), being a victim of crime (Perloff & Fetzer, 1986), and 
getting into a car accident (McKenna, 1993) is lower than for others.  Moreover, this 
bias affects the reception of information.  Optimistic people react to future positive 
information more than future negative information such as when people know that their 
estimate is better than the received information, they don't update their estimate, but 
when receiving information, which is better than their estimate, they update their 
estimate permanently (Sharot, 2011).  
2.5.2 Confusion between overconfident and optimistic bias 
There is some confusion between overconfidence and optimistic bias because they are 
related to each other. They are often use synonymously. The differences between these 
two biases are that the overconfidence bias is overconfident about their performance, 
believing that they are above average (Chaudhary, 2013), while optimistic bias focuses 
on the event, that they have a lower risk of negative events and higher chance of positive 
events.  In this study, we used the case of optimistic bias to demonstrate farmers’ 
preventative behavior in their farms, which also indicates their risk estimation. 
2.5.3 Direct and indirect measurements of the optimistic bias 
There are a variety of methods to study the optimistic bias, the most basic method is 
that the sample estimates their probability to experience with an event and this is 
compared to the others, or the average under the same conditions, such as the same sex 
or age. There are two methods to study the optimistic bias: the direct and indirect 
method (Helweg-Larsen & Shepperd, 2001).   
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The direct method was often used in the past. In this method, participants have to 
estimate their probability or likelihood to experience a situation anchored on a single 
scale. For example, compared to the average person of the same age and sex, how much 
higher or lower is your probability to experience a situation. The midpoint of the scale 
was labelled by researchers using the direct method to be the same as the average 
person. In the case of negative events, the optimistic bias mean scale is below the 
midpoint, which means that their opportunity to experience the negative event is lower 
than the average. On the other hand, in case of positive events, the optimistic bias mean 
scale is above the midpoint, which means that their proximity to experience the positive 
event is higher than the average person. For example, when participants have to answer 
the question “how probable is it that you will experience (some event) in your life, 
compared to the other people your sex and age? Nominally their answers are anchored 
by -3 = lower probability than average people and +3 = higher probability that average 
people (Helweg-Larsen & Shepperd, 2001).   
The indirect method is in contrast to the direct method. In the case of indirect method, 
participants have to estimate their probability to experience an event in the first question 
and then they have to estimate the probability of the other people their sex and age of 
experiencing the same even on a second question. Normally, the answer for each 
question is set on a 0 to 100 scale or from 1 (very unlikely) to 7 (very likely). When 
parson participants are asked to estimate a negative outcome, the score is calculated by 
deducting the other estimated possibility from their estimated possibility. The amount 
of the difference in the score demonstrates the size of optimistic bias. It is difficult to 
define whether each participant is optimistic, realistic, or pessimistic with these two 
methods. Moreover, some studies show that the bias of the direct method is higher than 
the indirect method because of the few response options (Helweg-Larsen & Shepperd, 
2001).   
The comparison between actual risk and estimated risk has been used in this study. This 
method seems to demonstrate the accuracy of people’s optimistic bias because people 
tend to overestimate other people’s risk more than underestimate their own risk (Burger 
& Burns, 1988). Comparisons between actual and estimated risk might be the solution 
to define the optimistic bias, but there are few studies with this approach (Helweg-
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Larsen & Shepperd, 2001).  However, in this study, the estimated risk is not asked 
directly. Many studies demonstrate that optimistic bias might be associated with 
preventative behavior. For example, there is low contraception use (Burger & Burns, 
1988) or influenza vaccination (Larwood, 1978), among optimistic people and they 
have sex with high risk (Sheer & Cline, 1994).  
2.6 International animal disease control policies 
Global pandemics such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome or SARS, in 2002, 
Avian influenza (H5N1) in 2003, Influenza A or Swine flu (H1N1) in 2009, Ebola in 
2014, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome or MERS in 2012, Corona virus disease 2019 
or COVID-19 in 2020 have reflected the importance of the global health issues. Global 
health organizations such as the WHO have prepared the guidelines and protocols to 
manage and control the impact of pandemics in the future. 
With the pandemic Influenza risk management guidance of WHO (2017), the phases of 
a pandemic are separated into four phases (Figure 13). The first phase is the 
interpandemic phase. This phase is the time between pandemics. The second phase is 
alert phase. In this phase, the infection has been identified and confirmed in human 
cases. Local, national, and global risk assessment is increased to predict whether the 
new virus will develop into a pandemic stage or not. The third phase is the pandemic 
phase. In this phase, the new virus is spreading on a global scale. The global risk 
assessment is important to prepare the fast or slow movement between the first, second, 
and third phase. Virological, epidemical, and clinical data are used to calculate the 
global risk assessment. The last phase is a transition phase. In this phase, the global risk 









In the case of the influenza virus, the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework or 
PIP framework was established in 2011 to share the virus, vaccine, and useful 
information between WHO, member countries, and industries (WHO, Pandemic 
Influenza Preparedness Framework for the sharing of influenza viruses and access to 
vaccines and other benefits, 2013). The objectives of the framework are the 
improvement of virus sharing and vaccines and medicine assessments for countries 
which require this during the present and future pandemics. The PIP framework was 
adopted at the 64th world health assembly. To maintain ongoing global monitoring and 
risk assessment, the member countries need to share PIP biological materials. The 
surveillance capacity building is also included in the benefit sharing between members. 
WHO have been taking care of the vaccine candidate review since 2004 and making 
public announcements immediately on the WHO website (WHO, Pandemic Influenza 
Risk Management: A WHO guide to inform and harmonize national and international 
pandemic preparedness and response, 2017). 
 
In the case of emergency risk, there is the system of emergency risk management for 
health or ERMH to prepare and respond to hazards, such as an influenza pandemic. 
There are four objectives of ERMH. First, country and community capacities should be 
Figure 13: The continuum of pandemic phases* 
Source: (WHO, Pandemic Influenza Risk Management: A WHO guide to inform and 
harmonize national and international pandemic preparedness and response, 2017) 
 
*This continuum is according to a “global average” of cases, over time, based on continued risk assessment 




strengthened to manage their own health risk. Second, the emergency risk management 
is ensured as a part in the health sector. Third, health system, multisector management 
system, and other relevant parts of society are linked and integrated. Fourth, national 
and international policies on emergency risk management are strengthened and 
supported. The ERMH explains the periods of preventing, mitigating, responding, and 
recovering from emergencies. The principles behind ERMH are comprehensive risk 
management (assessment and management), an all-hazards approach (developing and 
strengthening of all elements and systems), multisector approach (integrating 
government and society), multidisciplinary approach, community resilience (utilization 
of community capacities), sustainable development, and ethical basis. There are six 
categories of ERMH: policy and resource management, planning and coordination, 
information and knowledge management, health infrastructure and logistics, health and 
related services, and community ERMH capacity. More details about the components 
of each of the categories are summarized in table 7. The member countries of ERMH 
have received guidance and technical support from WHO based on World Health 
Assembly resolution (WHO, Pandemic Influenza Risk Management: A WHO guide to 













Table 11: Essential components in each category 
Categories Essential components 
Policy and Resource Management  Policies and legislation  
 Capacity development strategies   
 Monitoring, evaluation and reporting  
 Financing  
 Human resources   
Planning and Coordination  Coordination mechanisms   
 ERMH units in Ministries of Health  
 Prevention and mitigation planning 
and coordination    
 Preparedness and response planning 
and coordination    
 Recovery planning and coordination  
 Business continuity management  
 Exercise management 
Information and Knowledge Management  Risk assessments 
 Early warning and surveillance 
 Research for ERMH 
 Knowledge management 
 Information management 
 Public communications 
Health Infrastructure and Logistics  Logistics and supplies 
 Safer, prepared, and resilient health 
facilities 
Health and Related Services  Health care services  
 Public health measures 
 Specialized services for specific 
hazards 
Community ERMH Capacities    Local health workforce capacities 
and community-centered planning 
and action 
Source: (WHO, Pandemic Influenza Risk Management: A WHO guide to inform and 




Considering the section policy and resource management, the effective governance of 
ERHM based on appropriate policies and legislation. The all-hazard approach should 
be used for policies and legislation. For example, specific-hazard risk management 
measures have common components and the ERHM continuum should be covered by 
preventing, mitigating, preparing, responding, and recovering. National legislation 
should be aligned with international agreement and convention. It should define clear 
procedures of emergency management structures, including the duty of government 
authorities and other organizations, based on national risk management. The elements 
of ERHM should be considered by public health policy maker and should be part of the 
legislation. The member countries should develop a human resources plan and should 
define the requirement for health emergency staff. The role and responsibility of each 
authority and responder should be written for each specific function in the plan. WHO 
provides technical support to record the disease and economic impact (in cases of 
seasonal influenza) and national vaccine development policy, including support and 
guidance to improve health care staff through training. Moreover, WHO also provides 
information on the priority needs identification, prevention, mitigation, and response 
strategies to member countries (WHO, Pandemic Influenza Risk Management: A WHO 
guide to inform and harmonize national and international pandemic preparedness and 
response, 2017). 
Policy-makers are facing challenges in dealing with animal disease outbreaks at present 
and the future because of the increase of livestock product trading and markets, in many 
cases the regional concentration of livestock, and the impact of animal diseases on the 
international livestock market. This makes it clear that national livestock product 
strategies need to adopt the international policies and guidelines for controlling animal 
diseases. A good understanding of the impact of animal diseases on the whole market 
is a requirement for policy-makers to manage the economic cost in many sectors and 
also the whole economy. Moreover, they have to realize the power of policy 
intervention and the socioeconomic implication, which can change the livestock 
industrial structure. The whole economy can be affected by animal disease outbreaks, 
which policy-makers have to realize. In addition, policy-makers have to understand the 
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connections between local livestock market, other related sectors, and international 






















Chapter 3 Materials and methods 
This chapter includes the conceptual framework of this study to explain the 
methodologies and concept which are used to find the answer to the three research 
questions. The content in this chapter is divided into four parts. The first part is the 
conceptual framework of this study. The second part is the study design and 
methodology of the economic impact of the animal disease surveillance systems on 
farmers. The third part is the experimental design of incentives for animal disease 
reporters. And, the final part is the study design and statistical model of the impact of 
optimistic bias and others socio-economic factors on farmers’ reporting behavior.  
3.1 Conceptual framework 
The conceptual framework is separated into three parts to find the answers to each 
research question. The main topic of this study focuses on a digital animal disease 
surveillance system (the PODD project). The PODD project was a pilot project which 
was implemented in Chiang Mai. The conceptual framework demonstrates the 
relationship between concept and methodology in each question:  
- First, the impact assessment approach is used to find the economic 
impact of the PODD project on farmers in 74 local governments of 
Chiang Mai (Yano, et al., 2018). This part represents the impact on 
farmers, to demonstrate the economic change of backyard chicken 
farmers, which was the main focus of the PODD project. 
- Second, the experimental approach is used to find the influence of 
motivation on PODD reporting behavior via the PODD application 
on smartphones (Yano, et al., 2018). This part represents the impact 
on reporters or mobile application users. It demonstrates an efficient 
way to motivate reporters to be active reporters in the long-term. 
Moreover, it demonstrates the relationship with social activity when 
the monetary incentive was involved. 
- Finally, the logit model of reporting behavior is used to find the 
effect of socio-economic factors and farmer bias in reporting 
behavior. Following the concept of optimistic bias, which is when 
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people believe that their risk of a negative event is lower than that of 
others and their probability of positive event is higher than that of 
others (Harris & Hahn, 2011), we assume this bias can also have an 
effect on farmer reports. This part represents the farmers’ side in the 
role of animal disease reporting. It demonstrates the independent 
factors which impact on the farmers’ reports. And it proves the 
correction in a real situation of the neoclassic economic assumption 
following adverse selection in farmers’ reporting behavior (Wolf, 
2013). 
In this study, the three research questions were used to represent the whole picture of 
the impact of the systems. The full methodology and approach to finding the answers 
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Figure 14: Conceptual framework 
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3.2 Economic impact of animal diseases on farmers 
This part explains the method of economic impact assessment. To analyze the economic 
impact of the PODD project, this study focuses on a comparison of farmers’ variable 
costs, especially the cost of preventing animal diseases. The impact assessment was 
design on the basis of the PODD data available. In this study, the data was available at 
two points in time, before and after the PODD project intervention in the area. 
3.2.1 Study design 
This study is based on information from the PODD project, conducted in the Chiang 
Mai province, the province where the pilot was conducted. Seventy-four local 
governments participated in the project. The local governments selected the areas for 
which they were responsible to participate in the project. There was at least one PODD 
volunteer in each village.  
One of the expected outcomes of the project was to reduce the impact of animal diseases 
to farmers, especially to back yard chicken farmers. The project collected the data of 
variable farming costs in two periods. The base line data (before project intervention) 
was in 2015, and one year after the project intervention in 2016. The data of PODD 
project was not only collected in the areas of the project intervention but also in the 
non-project intervention areas.  
3.2.2 Procedures of the economic impact analysis 
For this study, the backyard chicken farmers in Chiang Mai area were selected to 
compare the impact of the project on farmers’ costs. The chicken farmers were divided 
into two groups. The first group was with a PODD group. The second group was 
without a PODD group. Then, each main group was divided into two periods of time 
based on the period of the PODD project intervention. The numbers of farmers in the 
group with a PODD were 82 (51 farmers - before PODD intervention, 31 farmers - after 
PODD intervention). The numbers of farmers in the group without a PODD were 95 




In the PODD intervention group, there was at least one PODD volunteer in their village. 
While, in the non-PODD intervention group, there was no PODD volunteer in their 
village. The volunteers would report the abnormal situation concerning the animals to 
the PODD center. It means that the group of PODD interventions would be more secure 
against animal diseases and the impact of animal diseases on farmers would be lower 
than in the non-PODD group, in cases where the PODD system was effective it 
followed the project expectation. 
Table 12: The numbers of participants in PODD and non-PODD project 
interventions (n=177).   














With PODD 51 31 82 
Without PODD 56 39 95 
Source: Data from PODD project   
3.2.3 Instruments of the economic impact analysis 
For the instruments of this topic, the variable costs of farmers from both groups were 
collected by PODD projects in 2015 and 2016. In this study, the project was allowed to 
access and use the economic data. Based on the focus of the project, which was chicken 
farmers, the variable cost of chicken farming was calculated and compared between 
two periods of time. The livestock unit of chicken was referenced by the European 
Commission, which set the coefficient of broilers at 0.007 (table 13) (Eurostat, 2020). 
It related to the kind of livestock in the impact assessment. We found that the kind of 
chicken in the area of study is not different and backyard chickens are the only kind of 
animal of this assessment. It means that it is not necessary to divide the total variable 
cost by the livestock unit to reduce the variance. In this section, the total variable costs 




Table 13: Livestock unit coefficients 
Kind of animals Detail 
Livestock 
unit 
Bovine animals  Under 1 year old 0,400 
 1 but less than 2 years old 0,700 
 Male, 2 years old and over 1,000 
 Heifers, 2 years old and over 0,800 
 Dairy cows 1,000 
 Other cows, 2 years old and over 0,800 
Sheep and goats  0,100 
Equidae  0,800 
Pigs Piglets having a live weight of under 20 kg 0,027 
 Breeding sows weighing 50 kg and over 0,500 
 Other pigs 0,300 
Poultry Broilers 0,007 
 Laying hens 0,014 
 Ostriches 0,350 
 Other poultry 0,030 
Rabbits, breeding females  0,020 
Source: Eurostat, 2020 
3.2.4 Statistical analysis 
For the data analysis of this study, the outcome variable in this topic is the total variable 
cost (TVC) per month, which was reported as the mean, using two-way ANOVA to test 
the significant interaction of treatment and time. The p-value was set at 0.05. The TVC 
per month from each group was separated into two periods of time; Period 1 (2015: 
before PODD intervention), Period 2 (2016: after PODD intervention). The values at each 
single point of time were compared by t-test (paired analyses). The p-value was set at 





3.3 Reporting behavior of the PODD reporter 
3.3.1 Study design 
This study is based on information from the Participatory One Health Disease Detection 
project, or the PODD project, conducted in the Chiang Mai province, the province 
where the pilot was conducted. Population in this study is 296 PODD volunteers, who 
participated in the project since 2015. The limiting condition of this study is the 
geographical structure where the province is mostly mountainous (Fig 15). This 
limitation has an effect on the quality of the Internet signal. Moreover, there was a 
variety of livestock and population densities in different areas of the province. We could 
not use systematic sampling from all of the volunteers in the PODD project because of 
the limiting condition.  
In this study, we recruited 67 volunteers from 17 areas of the study (3 to 5 volunteers 
per area). All volunteers were residing in the central part of Chiang Mai province to 
reduce the impact of other difference factors, i.e. the variety of livestock, population 




3.3.2 Procedures of the Incentives experiment 
For this study, participants were divided into two groups (Table 14). The first group 
was the experimental group, with 49 volunteers from 12 areas, who received a monthly 
transfer of 400 Baht1 (11.5 USD). The transfer included payment for covering cost of a 
smartphone (54.5 USD) and compensation for monthly calls and internet charges. 
Whether they reported or not, this group of volunteers was still paid every month until 
the end of the payment period. The volunteers in this group were drawn to this study 
by monetary incentive and were reminded of the monthly compensation and other 
benefits they received.  
The second group was the control group, with 18 volunteers from 5 areas, who received 
no compensation (no monthly salary, smartphone, or compensation for calls and 
internet charges). The volunteers in this group were drawn to this study without any 
                                                          
1 1 Bath equal to 0.028 USD or 0.026 EUR 
Figure 15: Geography of Chiang Mai 
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monetary incentive. They were motivated to participate in this study by the social 
incentive and used their own smartphone and internet package to install the PODD 
application and report.  
Both groups were informed about the benefits to society and trained by the PODD 
project with the same explanations regarding animal epidemics, the importance of 
reporting, and how to install and submit their report via smartphone applications. Their 
duty was to report both usual and unusual animal-related events in the communities for 
which they were responsible. Reports included taking photographs, sharing the 
location, and observing via the smartphone application. The type of the data on animal 
health abnormalities in this project was based on four categories of livestock; backyard 
chickens, pigs, dairy cattle, and beef cattle. They were trained by the project about how 
to observe the basic symptoms of important epidemic diseases such as Newcastle 
disease in poultry, porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome (PRRS) in pigs, and 
foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) in cattle. They also had to report any normal events to 
confirm that there were no unusual animal-related events in the area. For this reason, 
they had to report whether they had noticed any sign of animal diseases every day 
























Reports per month 





     
1 5 17 14 0 9 
2 4 19 13 17 2 
3 4 21 23 9 9 
4 4 23 13 16 5 
5 4 25 20 15 6 
6 4 22 10 5 6 
7 4 24 26 25 19 
8 4 28 25 24 8 
9 4 30 29 27 6 
10 4 24 17 0 0 
11 4 31 28 23 0 
12 4 27 31 24 8 
Control group:  
(Social Group)      
1 4 12 21 18 10 
2 4 30 12 11 8 
3 4 13 26 26 17 
4 3 11 19 9 18 
5 3 20 20 10 18 
Sources: Computation and analysis from PODD volunteers report database 
Note:  a  Period 1 refers to the period of 5 months before the end of compensation 
 b  Period 2 refers to the period of 1 month after the end of compensation 
 c  Period 3 refers to the period of 5 months after the end of compensation 
 d Period 4 refers to the period of 10 months after the end of compensation 
 
The only differences between the groups were the compensation in the form of a 
monthly salary payment, and with the provision of a smartphone with free calls and 
internet for the period of the study. We designed this study to answer three study sub-
questions based on our objectives. It could be identified as follows; 
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 Question 1 : During the period when compensation is paid, are the efforts of 
the volunteers in the monetary market group higher than those in the social 
market group? 
 Question 2 : Do the volunteers’ efforts in the monetary market group 
decrease at the end of the payment period, whereas the efforts of the 
volunteers in the social market group do not decrease over the same period 
of time? 
 Question 3 : Do the volunteers in the monetary market group perform less 
well compared to the social market group in the long-term after the 
compensation was terminated? 
 
From question 1, which demonstrates the effect of monetary incentives (compensation 
and smartphone with internet) on volunteers in the monetary incentive group, we 
assume that the effort of the monetary group is higher than that of the social group.  
Question 2 demonstrates the comparison of the efforts of both groups for all periods of 
time. Our assumption concerning this question is that the effort of the social group does 
not change over time, whereas the monetary group’s effort decreases once the 
compensation has terminated.  
Finally, question 3 reflects the effect of monetary incentives in the long-term. Our 
assumption concerning this question is that there is a negative effect from the monetary 
incentive in the long-term, which reduces the efforts of the monetary group. Moreover, 
this question demonstrates that when the monetary incentive is terminated, the 
volunteers will maintain their behavior based on the monetary incentive or return to the 
social incentive. 
3.3.3 Instruments of the incentives experiment 
For the instruments of this study, the reporting data from both groups on the PODD 
application were recorded by the PODD automatic system, which was linked to the 
Department of Livestock and the local government.  Each volunteer in both groups 
received their own ID to sign in on the PODD application. Their reports were measured 
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by the number of reports per month based on the areas for which they were responsible 
(Table 14).  
Moreover, as our study concerned the rate of occurrences, we calculated average reports 
per month by counting only whether a report was received, meaning that the variation 
of occurrences had no effect on the average reports per month. The maximum number 
of reports per month was 30-31, and the lowest number of reports was zero. The 
available data that was collected from the project covered a period of two years from 
2015-2016. As the social and monetary groups did not start participating in the project 
at the same time, this study used data collected after July 2015. 
3.3.4 Statistical analysis 
To analyze the data of this study, the outcome variable in this study is the number of 
reports per month. The number of reports per month was reported as the mean, using 
repeated measurement ANOVA to test the significant interaction of treatment and time. 
The p-value was set at 0.05. The number of reports per month from each group were 
separated into four periods of time; Period 1 (five months before the end of the 
compensation), Period 2 (one month after the end of the compensation), Period 3 (five 
months after the end of the compensation), and Period 4 (10 months after the end of the 
compensation). The values at each single point of time were compared by t-test (paired 
analyses). The p-value was set at 0.05 to demonstrate the significant differences. 
A number of questions were raised in relation to these study results. Question 1 was 
tested using a t-test to compare the average report between the two groups in Period 1 
(five months before the end of compensation). If the average report of the monetary 
group is higher than in the social group, our assumption that the effort of the monetary 
group is higher than the social group is correct. Question 2 was tested using repeated 
measurement ANOVA. Our assumption is that the effort of the social group does not 
change over time, while that of the monetary group decreases after the end of the 
compensation. Finally, Question 3 was tested using a t-test to compare the average 
report between the two groups in Period 4 (10 months after the end of compensation). 
If the result shows that there is a statistical significance, we can conclude that it is 
correct to say that the effort of the monetary group is lower than the social group. 
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3.4 Farmers’ aspect on animal health reports 
3.4.1 Study design  
In this study, we developed a logit model to test farmers’ optimistic bias and the other 
socio- economic factors. In the previous study, farmers’  reporting behavior was 
described by many factors; information accessibility, opportunity and transaction cost, 
gender, farm size, economic and educational status, social capital, risk perception 
(Brugere, Onuigbo, & Morgan, 2017).  However, we found that many factors were 
interrelated.  
First, opportunity and transaction costs can relate to farm size.  As an example, if the 
farm size is large scale, the opportunity and transaction costs are also higher than small 
scale farmers. In this case, we use livestock income as an explanation instead of farm 
size, because we have four kinds of animal.  Livestock income is easier to represent in 
a logit model than farm size and we would like to prove the assumption of neoclassic 
economics. Second, information accessibility, social capital, and risk perception relate 
to each other because when farmers have a strong social connection, they can access 
the animal outbreak information from their neighbors and the effect on their risk 
perception. In this case, we focus on risk perception, which is represented by optimistic 
bias. 
Gender is an unclear variable in terms of its effect on the framers’ reporting behavior. 
In many cases, men are less in contact with zoonotic diseases than women and women 
are more concerned about livestock health than men (Kristjanson, et al., 2010). While 
in some studies it is demonstrated that gender has no effect on risk situations (Cueva, 
et al., 2016), in the case of animal disease risk, there is a knowledge gap about the effect 
of gender on farmers, which we discovered in our model. Moreover, education is 
significant for farmers' adoption and decision-making, while farming experience is not 
significant (Adeogun, Ajana, Ayinla, Yarhere, & Adeogun, 2008). We also added these 
two variables to our model to test their effect of the farmers’ reporting decisions.  
3.4.2 Procedures and instruments of analysis 
The sample of this study was 467 animal farmers in the Chiang Mai Province. We used 
the data from PODD project. The questionnaire was divided into three parts.  The first 
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part concerned questions about animal disease. Farmers were asked about their reports 
to the livestock officer when there was an animal outbreak or illness in their farm. The 
answer to this question was binomial choice between reporting and not reporting. 
Another question was their experience with animal disease outbreaks on their farm. The 
second part concerned questions about their prevention of animal outbreaks, it was 
separated into four questions:  animal outbreak news updates, vaccinations, animal 
health checks, and farm cleaning (Table 15).  The answers to these questions were 
scored between 0 - 4:  zero means that the farmer took no or very limited prevention 
measures and four means a high level of prevention measures. The last part concerned 
socio-economic questions:  livestock income per month, experience of the farmer with 
livestock, gender, and years of education.  
Table 15: Preventive behavior of famers regarding animal outbreaks 
Sources: Own study design and data of PODD 
To calculate optimistic bias variable, the accurate way to estimate people’ s risk is 
comparing estimated risk and actual risk (Helweg-Larsen & Shepperd, 2001).  In this 
study, we compared actual risks and expected risk of disease outbreak with farmers 
(Figure 16).  For the actual risk part, we separated our observations according to the 
kind of animal: dairy cow, swine, chicken, and beef cow because the impact of animal 
disease in each kind of animal is different. We calculated actual risk from each kind of 
animal by the proportion of farmers who experienced an animal outbreak on their farm 
and transformed it into a percentage.  
Preventive behavior Answers 
Animal outbreak news updates (Never) 0 – 4 (diary) 
Vaccination for livestock on the farm (Never) 0 – 4 (all necessary vaccines) 
Livestock health checks (Never) 0 – 4 (diary) 
Farm cleaning (Never) 0 – 4 (diary) 
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In the estimated risk part, we calculated according to preventative behavior, because it 
can demonstrate the personal disease perception (Cummings, Becker, & Maile, 1980). 
Farmers’  expected risk variable was calculated by using the second part of the PODD 
questionnaire, through summation of the score from four actual preventive questions 
(maximum is 16, minimum is 0) and transformation into a percentage (Figure 16). 
In pre-final calculation part, we used farmer’s actual preventative behavior from four 
actual preventing questions instead of awareness of animal disease, because their 
awareness is not necessary to reflect their actual behavior (Crociata, Agovino, & Sacco, 
2015). For example, in some cases, farmers can be aware of animal diseases on their 
farm, but this does not mean that the farmer practices animal diseases prevention in 
their farm. In other words: farmers can be aware of animal diseases without practicing 
Figure 16: Optimistic bias calculation map 
Farmers’ expected 
risk 
Farmers’ actual risk 
α < 0  (No Bias) 
α > 0  (Bias) Infected farms/total 
farms 
- dairy cow 
- swine 
- chicken  
- beef cow 
Optimistic 
bias 
- Animal outbreak news updates 
- Vaccination for livestock in the farm 
- Livestock health checks  





prevention. Finally, the optimistic bias variable was calculated by actual risk minus 
farmers’  expected risk.  We define the optimistic bias of farmers by α (with −1 < α < 
1). If α is higher than 0, it means farmer has optimistic bias. If α is equal or lower than 
0 it means optimistic no bias (Figure 16).  
 
We developed the logit model from all of the independent variable explanations to test 
the impact of these variables. 
𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 
= 𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 + 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 
+𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛   
In this study, our assumption is that the optimistic bias affects farmers’ decisions 
more than the other socio-economic variables that we know. The definitions of all 
variables can be found in table 16. 
Table 16: Definitions of variables in the model 
Dependent variable  
Yi Farmer animal health reporting decision 
which takes the value of 1 for reports and 0 
otherwise 
Independent variable  
LINC (X1) Livestock income (USD) 
OB (X2) Optimistic bias, measured  by farmer’s 
expected risk minus by actual risk (if the 
value is higher than 0, farmer has optimistic 
bias) 
Farm_Exp (X3) Years of farming experience (in years) 
Gender (X4) Farmer’s gender, which takes the value of 1 
if the farmer is a man and 0 otherwise 
Edu_year (X5) Years of farmer’s education (in years) 




Chapter 4 Results 
There are three major objectives of this study. First, this study aims to estimate the 
economic impact of the PODD project on farmers, especially backyard chicken farmers. 
Second, this study aims to find the impact of social and monetary incentives on the 
effort of PODD reporters to report the animal health situation via the smartphone 
application. Third, this study aims to describe and determine the influential factors, 
which impact on farmers’ animal disease reporting behavior. The research questions 
corresponding to these major objectives are: 
1. What should the differences be between the areas with and without the 
PODD project intervention in the duration of one year? If there are 
differences, how great is the economic impact of the PODD project on 
backyard chicken farmers in Chiang Mai? 
2. How effective are social and monetary incentives for motivating PODD 
reporters in the long-term?? 
3. What are the factors which impact on the farmer’s reporting behavior of 
animal diseases and how great is the impact of optimistic bias on farmers? 
This chapter includes the statistical analysis of each research question represented. The 
results are divided into two sections for each research question. The first section 
demonstrates descriptive analyses of all variables. The second section describes the 
statistic models which are selected for analysis in each research question. The results 
of this chapter are used for the discussion and conclusion in the chapter 5. 
4.1 Economic impact of the PODD project on farmers 
This section describes an analysis of the economic impact of the PODD project on 
farmers. The data of livestock total variable cost from the PODD project was used to 
analyze the impact. The unit of livestock total variable cost is USD per month. Farmers 
in the data are backyard chicken farmers, which is the most important group of the 
PODD project. The farmers were divided into two groups, which are a without PODD 
group (control group) and a with PODD group (experimental group). The data of these 
two groups was collected by the PODD project in two periods, which were in 2015 
(before the PODD project intervention) and in 2016 (one year after the PODD project 
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intervention). The results in this section are divided into two subsections. The first 
subsection is descriptive statistics and the second subsection is a two-way ANOVA 
analysis. 
4.1.1 Descriptive statistical analysis of the economic impact of the PODD project 
on farmers 
This subsection demonstrates the descriptive statistical analysis of the livestock total 
variable cost from two groups (without the PODD intervention group and with the 
PODD intervention group) between two periods of time (before and after the PODD 
intervention). This data is used to analyze two-way ANOVA analysis in the latter 
subsection. 
Table 17: Mean and standard deviation of the livestock total variable cost (USD) 
per month of backyard chicken farmers in each group between the period of 
before and after PODD intervention (n = 177) 
 Before PODD intervention After PODD intervention 
Group Mean SD n Mean SD n 
Without PODD 25.680 37.909 56 42.343 46.717 39 
With PODD 26.122 28.965 51 157.852 336.530 31 
Sources: Calculation 
 
The descriptive result in table 17 demonstrates that the livestock total variable cost 
per month of backyard chicken farmers before the PODD project intervention 
between the without PODD and the with PODD groups is not so different. The 
average total variable cost of the with PODD group is 25.68 USD per month (n = 56), 
while the total variable cost in the without PODD group is 26.122 USD per month (n 
= 51). However, the SD in both groups is very high (37.909 in the group without 
PODD, 28.965 in the group with PODD). In the period of after PODD intervention, 
the average livestock total variable cost between the with and without PODD groups 
is very different. The result indicates that the average total variable cost in the group 
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with PODD is higher than the group without PODD. The average total variable cost 
is 42.343 USD per month (n = 39) in the group without PODD and 157.852 USD per 
month (n = 31) in the group with PODD. However, in the same way as with the period 
before PODD intervention, the SD of both groups is very high (46.717 in the group 
without PODD, 157.852 in the group with PODD) 
Table 18: Frequency and percentage of the duration variable and group 
variable  
Variable  Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Duration Before 107 60.5 60.5 
 After 70 39.5 100.0 
 total 177 100.0  
Group Without 
PODD 
95 53.7 53.7 
 With PODD 82 46.3 100.0 
 total 177 100.0  
Sources: Calculation     
The descriptive results in table 18 demonstrate that, for the duration variable, there 
are 107 farmers or 60.5 percent in the period before the PODD intervention and 70 
farmers or 39.5 percent in the period after the PODD intervention. The total number 
is 177. In the group variable, there are 95 farmers or 53.7 percent, which are in the 
area with the PODD project, and 82 farmers or 46.3 percent, which are not in the 
area. The total number is 177. The preliminary interpretation of the results is that, in 
this study, the number of farmers in the group with and without the PODD 
intervention is almost equal (54:46) and in the period between before and after the 






4.1.2 The economic impact analysis of the PODD project on farmers by two-
way ANOVA 
The statistical analysis of this topic is two-way ANOVA. There are two dependent 
variables. The first factor is the duration. There are two values in this variable, which 
are before (collected in 2015 - before the PODD intervention) and after (collected in 
2016 - one year after the PODD intervention). The second factor is the group. There 
are two values in this variable, which are the group “with PODD” intervention 
(experimental group) and the group “without PODD” intervention (control group). 
And there is one dependent variable in the analysis, which is livestock total variable 
cost per month. 
Before the two-way ANOVA analysis, the data was tested on three assumptions of 
the two-way ANOVA. The test demonstrates that there is no outlier in the data, which 
is the first assumption. However, the data does not have normal distribution, which 
is the second assumption. Moreover, when the data was tested by Levene’s test, the 
result shows a problem with homogeneity, which is the third assumption. This means 
that the data violates the assumptions of the two-way ANOVA. 
Due to the data violation of the two-way ANOVA assumptions, it is necessary to 
transform the data before using it in the two-way ANOVA analysis. The log 10 
transformation is used to transform the data. The result of data transformation by log 
10 demonstrates that that transformed data has normal distribution, which does not 
violate the assumptions. Table 19 demonstrates the normality test of the data between 
two independent variables. All normality tests show values significantly higher than 
0.05, which means that the data has normal distribution. Moreover, the Levene’s test 
result demonstrates the significant value is more than 0.05, which means that there is 
no problem of homogeneity (Table 19). After data transformation by log 10, the 
transformed data does not violate the assumptions of the two-way ANOVA.  
67 
 
Table 19: Normality and homogeneity tests of transformed economic impact 
data by log10 (N = 177) 
Model 
Normality test Homogeneity test 
Shapiro-Wilk Levene's Test 
df sig F sig 
Before*Without PODD 56 .871 
2.252                    .084 
Before*With PODD  51 .293 
After*Without PODD 39 .412 





In table 20, the result of the two-way ANOVA demonstrates that the independent 
variables are statistically significant in explaining the dependent value. The p-value 
of the duration variable is 0.000, which is lower than 0.01. This means that the period 
between before and after the PODD intervention is different. The livestock total 
variable cost of backyard chicken farmers one year after the PODD intervention is 
higher than before the intervention (table 17 and figure 17).  
Moreover, the p-value of the group variable is 0.014, which is lower than 0.05 (table 
20). This means that the group between without and with the PODD intervention is 
different. The livestock total variable cost of farmers in the group with the PODD 
intervention is higher than the group without the PODD (table 17 and figure 17).  
It is important here that the result shows that the effect of duration and group is not 
statistically significant. The p-value of duration and group is 0.141, which is higher 
than 0.05 (table 20). This means that the effect between duration and group cannot 
explain the livestock total variable cost of farmers. In other words, the intervention 
of the PODD project in the one year period has no impact on the livestock total 
variable cost of farmers.  
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Based on these results, the preliminary interpretation is that there is no impact from 
the PODD project on backyard chicken farmers in the period of one year. The project 
could not reduce the variable cost of farmers, which includes the cost of animal 
disease prevention and economic lost from animal diseases. The farmers did not 
receive the benefit of the project by cost reduction. It also demonstrates that, in the 
period of one year, the digital animal disease surveillance system might be not 
enough to have an impact on farmers, because the system needs more than one year 
to increase the impact. Moreover, some success factors might be disregarded such as 
farmers’ reporting behavior or the motivation of reporters, which are analyzed in the 
latter section. 
 








Duration 5.724 1 5.724 22.445 .000** 
Group 1.582 1 1.582 6.203 .014* 
Duration* Group .559 1 .559 2.192 .141 
R Squared = .139, Adjusted R Squared = .124 





4.2 Reporting behavior of the PODD reporters 
This section contains an analysis of the PODD reporters’ efforts to report the animal 
health situation using the PODD application. The report statistics of the PODD 
reporters from the PODD project were used to analyze the impact. The unit of the report 
variable is the number of reports per month (min = 0, max = 30). The PODD reporters 
were divided into two groups, the (I) social incentive group (control group) and the (II) 
monetary incentive group (experimental group). The data from these two groups was 
collected by the PODD project in four periods of time, which were 5 months before the 
end of compensation (period 1), 1 month after the end of compensation (period 2), 5 
months after the end of compensation (period 3), and 10 months after the end of 
compensation (period 4). The results in this section are divided into two subsections. 
The first subsection is descriptive statistics and the second subsection is the RM-
ANOVA or repeated measurement ANOVA. The statistical analysis in this section 
Figure 17: Livestock total variable cost of farmers in each group between before 
























relates to three sub-research questions which were described in chapter 3. These are 
identified as follows; 
 Question 1 : During the period when compensation is paid, are the efforts of 
the volunteers in the monetary market group higher than those of the 
volunteers in the social market group? 
 Question 2 : Do the volunteers’ efforts in the monetary market group 
decrease at the end of the payment period, but the efforts of the volunteers 
in the social market group do not decrease over the same period of time? 
 Question 3 : Do the volunteers in the monetary market group perform less 
well compared to the social market group in the long-term after the 
compensation has been terminated? 
4.2.1 Descriptive statistical analysis of the PODD reporters’ behavior 
This section concerns the descriptive statistical analysis of the PODD reporters’ 
behavior. The dependent variable in this analysis is the monthly reports. The 
independent variables are the groups (social and monetary incentive groups) and the 
time periods (four periods). The dependent variable is separated and analyzed on the 
basis of two independent variables. Thereafter, the data is used to analyze the RM-
ANOVA in the latter subsection. 
The descriptive results in table 21 demonstrate that the number of reports per month of 
the PODD reporters in period 1 is different between two groups. The average reports 
per month of the social incentive group is 17.32 reports per month (SD = 7.88, n = 5), 
while in the monetary incentive group it is 24.15 reports per month (SD = 4.23, n = 12). 
In period 2, the average reports per month of both groups are no different. The average 
reports per month of the social incentive group is 19.70 reports per month (SD = 4.94, 
n = 5), while in the monetary incentive group it is 20.7 USD per month (SD = 7.09, n 
= 12). In period 3, the average reports per month of both groups are no different. The 
average reports per month of the social incentive group is 14.75 reports per month (SD 
= 7.03, n = 5), while in the monetary incentive group it is 15.36 reports per month (SD 
= 9.81, n = 12). And, in the last period, the average reports per month of both groups 
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are different again. The average reports per month of the social incentive group is 14.05 
reports per month (SD = 4.78, n = 5), while in the monetary incentive group it is 6.46 
reports per month (SD = 4.92, n = 12). This means that the reports per month of the 
monetary group are higher than the social group in period 1. In periods 2 and 3, the 
reports per month of both groups are no different. And, in period 4, the reports per 
month of the social group are higher than the monetary group. The preliminary 
interpretation of these results is that the social incentive group can maintain the effort 
of the reporters in the long-term, while the monetary incentive group can increase the 
effort of the reporters in the period of payment. However, after the payment was 
terminated, the reporters cannot change their motivation from the monetary incentive 
to the social incentive in the long-term. 
Considering the number of reports per month in each group, the average reports per 
month of the social incentive group in 4 periods is not so different (period 1 = 17.32, 
period 2 = 19.70, period 3 = 14.75, period 4 = 14.05), while the average reports per 
month of the monetary incentive group in 4 periods is different (period 1 = 24.15, period 
2 = 2.07, period 3 = 15.36, period 4 = 6.46). In other words, the number of reports per 
month of the social incentive group is stable overtime, while the reports per month of 
the monetary incentive group decreases over time. However, the results at this stage 
needs to be confirmed by statistical significance in the next section. 
Table 21: Descriptive results comparing social and monetary groups in periods 1 
to 4  
 
Social group 
n = 5 
Monetary group 
n = 12 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
Period 1 17.32 7.88 24.15 4.23 
Period 2 19.70 4.94 20.7 7.09 
Period 3 14.75 7.03 15.36 9.81 





4.2.2 The PODD reporters’ behavior analysis by repeated-measures ANOVA  
To obtain the result of this study, we tested the normality, correlated error, and 
homogeneity using the dependent variable (monthly report) between the four periods 
of time, the duration of each of which was a five-month interval. This data did not 
violate the assumption before analysis of repeated-measures ANOVA (table 22). The 
normality test in four periods of time was tested by the Shapior-Wilk test. The result 
demonstrates that the value of α of four periods of time is higher than 0.05, which means 
that there is no violation of normality assumption. There is normal distribution in the 
four periods. The homogeneity test in four periods of time was done using Levene's Test. 
The result demonstrates that the value of α of four periods of time is higher than 0.05, 
which means that there is no violation of the homogeneity assumption. There is no 
homogeneity in the four periods. The multicollinearity test result demonstrates that the 
value of VIF of four periods of time is lower than 3, which means that there is no 











test Multicollinearity test 
Shapiro-Wilk Levene's Test Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
df α F α TL
e VIFf TL VIF TL VIF TL VIF 
Period 
1a 
17 .497 3.448 
.083   .631 1.584 .642 1.558 .919 1.089 
Period 
2b 
17 .593 2.513 
.134 .459 2.177   .823 1.215 .472 2.119 
Period 
3c 
17 .195 .892 
.360 .472 2.121 .831 1.204   .457 2.190 
Period 
4d 
17 .077 .231 
.638 .960 1.042 .677 1.476 .649 1.540   
Sources: Calculation 
Note:  a  Period 1 refers to the period of 5 months before the end of compensation 
 b  Period 2 refers to the period of 1 month after the end of compensation 
 c  Period 3 refers to the period of 5 months after the end of compensation 
 d Period 4 refers to the period of 10 months after the end of compensation 
 e TL refers to tolerance 
 f VIF is the variance inflation factor  
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Figure 18 :Reporting effort of PODD volunteers in social and monetary groups  
As shown in Figure 18, sub question 1, which is “during the period when compensation 
is paid, are the efforts of the volunteers in the monetary market group higher than those 
of the volunteers in the social market group?” was tested using a t-test to compare the 
reports of the two groups in Period 1. The results indicate that the average number of 
reports of the monetary group were 24.146 reports per month, while that of the social 
group was 17.32 reports per month (Table 23). During the time in which volunteers in 
the monetary group were paid, the monetary group's effort was significantly higher than 
that of the social group, the p-value, p   = 0. 032 (Table 23). Therefore, the first 
assumption was confirmed by these results. It means that during the period when 
compensation is paid, the efforts of the volunteers in the monetary market group is 
higher than those in the social market group due to the impact of the monetary incentive. 
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Then sub question 2, which is “do the volunteers’ efforts in the monetary market group 
decrease at the end of the payment period, but the efforts of the volunteers in the social 
market group do not decrease over the same period of time?” was tested using the RM 
ANOVA. The results indicated that the reports of the monetary group were found to 
have a statistically significant decreasing trend, F3,13 = 25. 512, p < 0. 001 (Table 24). 
The descriptive statistics in Table 23 indicated the decreasing trend of the monetary 
group’s reports. Moreover, the results indicated that there were no significant 
differences of reporting effort in the social group throughout the experimental period, 
F3,13= 2.001, the p-value,  p = 0.164 (Table 24). The second assumption was therefore 
confirmed by these results. This means that the volunteers’ efforts in the monetary 
market group decreased at the end of the payment period, whereas the efforts of the 
volunteers in the social market group did not decrease over the same period of time. 
Table 23: Comparing social and monetary groups in periods 1 to 4 by t-test 
 
Social group 
n = 5 
Monetary 
group 
n = 12 
t- test 
 Mean SD Mean SD t df p-value 
Period 1 17.32 7.88 24.15 4.23 -
2.36 
15 .032* 
Period 2 19.70 4.94 20.7 7.09 -
.285 
15 .779 
Period 3 14.75 7.03 15.36 9.81 -
.128 
15 .900 
Period 4  14.05 4.78 6.46 4.92 2.92 15 .011* 
Source: Calculation 






Table 24: The result of the repeated measurement ANOVA test between social and 
monetary groups  
Group Value F p-value 
Social group Pillai's trace .316 2.001 .164 
Wilks' lambda .684 2.001 .164 
Hotelling's trace .462 2.001 .164 
Roy's largest root .462 2.001 .164 
Monetary group Pillai's trace .855 25.512 .000** 
Wilks' lambda .145 25.512 .000** 
Hotelling's trace 5.887 25.512 .000** 
Roy's largest root 5.887 25.512 .000** 
Source: Calculation 
** (p < 0.01) 
Finally, sub question 3, which is “do the volunteers in the monetary market group 
perform less well compared to the social market group in the long-term after the 
compensation has been terminated?” was tested using the t-test to compare the reporting 
of the two groups in Period 4. The results indicated that after the compensation was 
terminated for 10 months, the monetary group demonstrated significantly lower 
reporting effort than the social group, the p-value, p < 0. 01 (Table 23).  The average 
reporting effort of monetary group was 6.458 times per month, while the result of the 
social group was 14.05 times per month (Table 23). Thus, the third assumption was also 
confirmed by these results. This means that the volunteers in the monetary market 
group perform less well compared to the social market group in the long-term after the 
compensation has been terminated. 
The following can be stated as a brief preliminary summary concerning this section of 
the PODD reporters’ behavior:  
(I) The monetary market can increase the effort of the reporter until the 
monetary incentive is terminated. During the payment period, the 




(II) After the payment was terminated, the effort of the reporters in monetary 
market decreased over time. This means that the monetary market has 
no power to keep the effort at a high level when there is no monetary 
incentive in exchange. On the other hand, the social market can keep the 
effort of the reporters at the same level. This means that the social 
market is more effective than the monetary market in the long-term 
without a monetary incentive. 
(III) In the long-term, the reporters in the monetary market could not return 
to the social market. This means that when the reporters were put into 
the monetary market, it took longer than 10 months to bring them back 
to the social market. When social markets and monetary markets 
confront each other, social markets will disappear for a long time. 
(IV) The standard labor model of economics cannot be used as an explanation 
in this study, because the effort of the reporters did not immediately 
decrease to zero after the payment was terminated, which means that the 
reporters spent their effort even though they no longer received 
payment. This study found that monetary markets have a negative 
impact in the long-term after 10 months of the terminated payment. 
However, the behavior of the reporters in the monetary market cannot 
be fully explained by the standard labor model of economics or the 
monetary market. It seems to be in between the monetary market and 
social market because the effort after the terminated payment was not 
zero and not at the same level as the social market in the long-term.  
4.3 Farmers’ behavior on animal health reports 
This section is an analysis of the variables which impact on the farmers’ reporting 
behavior of animal health. There are 5 variables in the logit model: livestock income, 
optimistic bias, farming experience, education, and gender. However, the optimistic 
bias in this study is indirectly calculated by the preventative behavior, actual risk, and 
expected risk. The data in the model was collected by the PODD project in 2015. The 
results in this section are divided into two subsections. The first subsection is 
descriptive statistics and the second subsection is the logit model. 
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4.3.1 Descriptive statistics of farmers’ report behavior 
The descriptive result in table 25 demonstrates four preventative behavior variables. 
First, the animal diseases update mean value is 3.081 (SD = 1.49). Second, the use of 
required vaccines mean value is 2.739 (SD = 1.718). Third, the livestock health check 
mean value is 3.421 (SD = 1.344). Finally, the farm cleaning mean value is 3.439 (SD 
= 1.258). The maximum and minimum values of these four variables are 4 and 0 in 
order. The average values of these four variables are presented in percentage of the 
farmers’ expected risk of animal diseases. The mean value of the farmers’ expected risk 
of animal diseases is .792 (SD = .256). The data from the PODD project demonstrates 
that the mean value of actual risk of animal diseases is .217 (SD = .157). The optimistic 
bias variable is calculated from the actual risk of animal diseases minus the farmers’ 
expected risk of animal diseases. The mean value of the optimistic bias is -.575 (SD = 
.372).  
The preliminary interpretation following these results is that the preventive behavior of 
farmers is at a high level (80%). Usually, they update the information about animal 
diseases, use the required vaccines on their farms, check animal health, and clean their 
farms. The result of high levels of preventive behavior refers to the high expected 
probability of animal disease infection on their farms. On the other hand, the actual 
probability of animal disease infection on their farms is lower than their expectation. 











Table 25: Mean and standard deviation of the variables in the calculation of farmers’ 
expected risk and the optimistic bias (n = 467) 
Variable Mean value Standard deviation 
Animal diseases update 3.081 1.49 
Use of required vaccines 2.739 1.718 
Livestock health check 3.421 1.344 
Farm cleaning 3.439 1.258 
Farmers’ expected risk of animal 
diseases 
.792 .256 
Actual risk of animal diseases .217 .157 
Optimistic bias -.575 .372 
Source: Calculation 
 
Table 26: Mean and standard deviation of independent variables (livestock income, 
optimistic bias, farming experience, and farmer’s education) in logit model 
Variable Mean value Standard deviation 
Livestock income  (LINC) 43.54 75.091 
Optimistic Bias (OB) -.575 .372 
Farming experience (Farm_Exp) 12.588 10.711 
Farmers’ education (Edu_years) 7.212 3.393 
Source: Calculation 
Table 26 shows the descriptive statistics of the quantitative variables in the model. The 
First quantitative variable is livestock income. The mean value of livestock income is 
43.54 $ per day and the standard deviation is 75.09. The second quantitative variable is 
the calculated optimistic bias of farmers and the value is between -1 to 1. If the value 
is positive, this demonstrates optimistic bias on the part of the farmers. On the other 
hand, the negative value demonstrates no optimistic bias on the part of the farmers. In 
case of zero value, this means that the actual risk of farmers is equal to expected risk of 
the farmers. The negative mean value demonstrates that most of farmers have no 
optimistic bias. It shows the perfect risk evaluation of farmers and also no optimistic 
bias in this case.  
For example, in the event that a farmer has an optimistic bias, he will have low 
preventive behavior, because he believes that the probability of animal disease infection 
80 
 
on his farm is lower than for other farmers. In this case, the expected risk of the farmer 
decreases because of the impact of optimistic bias. When we calculate the optimistic 
value in this case, it will be a positive value, because the actual risk is higher than their 
expected risk. On the other hand, in the case of a farmer who has no optimistic bias, he 
will have a high level of preventive behavior, because he believes that the probability 
of animal disease infection in his farm is equal or higher than for other farmers. In this 
case, the expected risk of the farmer does not decrease by the optimistic bias. When we 
calculate the optimistic value in this case, it will be an equal or negative value because 
the actual risk is equal or lower than their expected risk. 
The third quantitative variable is the farming experience of farmers. The unit for this 
variable is years of work on the farm. The result shows the average farming experience 
is 12.59 years. The last quantitative variable is the number of years of farmers’ 
education. The average of years of education is 7.21 years. 
Table 27: Frequency and percentage of the gender variables in the logit model 
Variable Value Frequency Percent 
Gender male 200 42.8 
 female 267 57.2 
 total 467 100.0 
Source: Calculation 
Table 27 shows the descriptive statistics of a qualitative variable in the model. In this 
model, there are two values for the gender variable (male and female). The frequency 
of males is 200, which is 42.8 percent of the sample size. On the other hand, the 
frequency of females is 267, which is 57.2 percent of the sample size. The gender 
variable is one of the independent variables in the logit model. 
The preliminary interpretation following the results is that most of the farmers have 
high livestock income (43.54 USD) compared to the minimum wage per day (12 USD). 
The standard deviation of the livestock income is very high because there are income 
variations for each kind of animal such as, dairy cow, backyard chicken, swine, and 
beef cow. In this study, most of farmers have no optimistic bias, which means than they 
demonstrate a high level of preventative behavior. Primary school is the largest 
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education level of farmers, which means that they can read and write the Thai language 
to receive the animal disease information. Most of the farmers have been working for 
7 years on the farm, which means that they are not new farmers. Moreover, in this study 
the number of males and females is almost equal (43:57). 
4.3.2 Farmers’ reporting behavior analysis by logit model 
Table 28 is the multicollinearity test of the independent variables: livestock income 
(LINC), optimistic bias (OB), farming experience (Farm_Exp), and farmers’ education 
(Edu_years). The result demonstrates that the tolerance values are around .672 - .884 
and the VIF (Variance inflation factor) is around 1.131 – 1.488, which is lower than 3. 
This means that all of the independent variables in the model have no correlation to 
each other. There is no multicollinearity in the logit model. 
Table 28: The result of multicollinearity test of independent variables (livestock 




LINC 884.  1.131 
OB .867 1.142 
Farm_Exp .674 1.485 










Table 29: Result of farmers’ reporting behavior analysis by logit model 
Variable Coefficient S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp )B(  
LINC .000 .000 .432 1 .511 1.000 
OB -3.388 .418 65.798 1 .000 **  .034 
Farm_Exp .031 .011 7.569 1 .008 **  1.031 
Edu_years .072 .037 1.897 1 .048* 1.075 
Gender -0.013 .227 .002 1 .955 .987 
Constant -2.364 .397 35.510 1 .000 .094 
N =467, Nagelkerke R Square . =326, Overall percentage  =71.3 
* p < .05 , ** p < .01 
Source: Calculation 
In table 29, there are two variables which are not significant (p >.05): livestock income 
( LINC)  and gender.  This means that these two variables have no impact on farmers’ 
reporting behavior.  Only three variables in this model are significant at p < . 01: 
optimistic bias ( OB) , education (Edu_years), and the years of farming experience 
(Farm_Exp). The value of the optimistic bias coefficient is -3.388. This means that the 
optimistic bias has a negative relationship with farmers’  reporting behavior.  The 
expected probability of animal disease reports of farmers with the optimistic bias is 
lower compared to farmers without the optimistic bias. In another word, farmers 
without the optimistic bias have a higher expected probability to report animal diseases. 
The EXP(B) value is .034, which means that when farmers have optimistic bias, the 
expected probability of animal disease reports decreases by 96% .  In addition, the 
variable of farming experience has a positive relationship with farmers’  reporting 
behavior (coefficient = .031). The Exp(B) value of the years of farming experience is 
1. 031.  This means that when the years of farming experience increase, farmers’ 
reporting behavior increases 3.1%.  Another variable in this model is significant at p < 
. 05:  Education (Edu_years). The Exp( B)  value of the years of farming experience is 
1. 075.  This means that when the years of farming experience increase, farmers’ 




We can write the following logit equation from this result: 
𝑌 = −2.364 + (−3.388)𝑂𝐵 + 0.031𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝐸𝑥𝑝 + .072𝐸𝑑𝑢_𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 





No 107 83 56.3 
Yes 50 223 81.7 
 tolal 71.3 
Source: Calculation 
Table 30 is the percentage of the accuracy of prediction in the logit model. The model 
can predict the probability of non-reporting at 56.3% and it can also predict the 
probability of reporting at 81.7%. In total, the model can predict the probability of non-
reporting and reporting at 71.3. The apparent error rate is 28.7%.  
The preliminary interpretation of these results is that there are three variables which can 
explain the animal disease reporting behavior of farmers. The first variable is the 
optimistic bias. It has a strong negative relationship with the farmers’ reporting. If 
farmers have optimistic bias, their probability to report decreased by 96%. Moreover, 
the second variable is farming experience, which has a weakly positive relation to the 
farmers’ reporting. If the number of years of farming experience increases, the 
probability of reporting increased by 3%. The last variable is the number of education 
years, which also has a weakly positive relation to the farmer’s report. If the number of 
education years increases, the probability of reporting increases by 7.5%. On the other 
hand, the livestock income, which should be the main variable to explain, has no 
relation to the farmer’s report. It is the very interring result and will be discussed in the 
next chapter. Finally, the gender variable also has no relation to the farmer’s report. 
In summary, there are three main results in this study. Firstly, that there is no impact of 
the PODD project on backyard chicken farmers in the period of one year. The project 
could not reduce the variable cost of farmers, which includes the cost of animal disease 
prevention and economic loss from animal diseases. It also demonstrates that, in the 
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period of one year, the digital animal diseases surveillance system might not be enough 
to have an impact on farmers, because the system needs more than one year to increase 
the impact.  
Secondly, the monetary market can increase the effort of the reporter until the monetary 
incentive is terminated. The monetary market has no power to keep the effort at a high 
level after there is no monetary incentive in exchange. On the other hand, the social 
market is more effective than the monetary market in the long-term, without a monetary 
incentive. In the long-term, the reporters in the monetary market could not return to the 
social market because monetary markets have a negative impact on the reporters. 
However, the result demonstrates that the behavior of the reporters in the monetary 
market cannot be fully explained by the standard labor model of economics or the 
monetary market. It seems to be in between the monetary market and social market, 
because the effort after the terminated payment was not zero and not at the same level 
as the social market in the long-term. 
Thirdly, the animal disease reporting behavior of farmers can be explained by three 
factors. The first factor is optimistic bias, which has a strong negative relationship with 
the farmers’ reporting. The second factor is farming experience, which has a weakly 
positive relation to the farmers’ reporting. The last variable is the number of education 
years, which has also weakly positive relation to the farmers’ reporting. On the other 
hand, the livestock income and gender factor have no relation to the farmers’ reporting.  
In general, the zero impact of the PODD project on backyard chicken farmers in the 
period of one year might be explained by the time period of the impact evaluation and 
the other two topics in this study. First, the PODD reporters were mostly motivated by 
monetary incentives, and the result demonstrates that their effort decreases over time. 
This can have an impact on the effectiveness of the system to control animal diseases 
in the area. When the reporter has low effort, the chance of no reporting of animal 
diseases increases. Second, most farmers have no optimistic bias. However, the one or 
two farmers who do have optimistic bias can be spreaders in their area because they 
have low preventative behavior and do not report the animal diseases on their farm. The 
PODD system cannot detect the animal outbreaks in the initial period so it cannot 
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reduce the economic loss of the animal outbreak’s impact. That is the reason why this 
study found that there is no the impact of the project on farmers’ cost on the part of the 




























Chapter 5 Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter covers the discussions and conclusions from the statistical analysis and the 
results from the previous chapter. The discussions and conclusions are divided into 
three parts according to the research purposes. The first part is the discussions and 
conclusions of the economic impact of the PODD project on backyard chicken farmers. 
The second part is the discussions and conclusions of the motivation of the PODD 
reporters in the digital animal diseases surveillance system. Finally, the last part is the 
discussions and conclusions of the influential factors on farmers’ reporting behavior of 
animal diseases. An overall and comprehensive discussion, including all relevant 
aspects is provided in the final subchapter.   
5.1 Economic impact of the PODD project on farmers 
1) Discussion  
The assumption of the economic impact assessment of the PODD project on farmers is 
that the PODD system could reduce the impact of animal diseases on backyard chicken 
farmers by reducing the total variable costs. However, the results in the previous chapter 
demonstrate that there was no impact of the PODD project on backyard chicken farmers 
over the period of one year. This means that the variable costs for farmers, including 
the cost of animal disease prevention and economic loss from animal diseases, could 
not be reduced by the PODD system, contrary to the assumption. This is the reason why 
farmers could not perceive the benefit from the project in the reduction of their variable 
costs.  
Compared to the traditional surveillance system, which is based on official reports from 
the health department or government agencies, the slowness of report receiving and 
reacting in each stage within the surveillance system is the problem with the traditional 
surveillance system, which can effect on official reports. The existing surveillance 
system can miss a case if the patient cannot seek out public health services or the health 
care providers make the wrong diagnosis or improperly submit a report. Moreover, the 
case can be lost through the failure of laboratory testing or if results are not confirmed. 
For these reasons, official reports can demonstrate underreporting of cases in the 
traditional surveillance system (Madoff & Li, 2014). 
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The PODD project used advanced technologies in the surveillance system. For 
example, GPS technology, smartphones, and internet were united and used jointly in 
the system to detect and share the information about animal diseases to the related 
partners. These advanced technologies can obviously improve the problem of slowness 
in the traditional surveillance systems. Moreover, the report receiving and reacting in 
each stage could be done on time. Therefore, the capability of the PODD surveillance 
system to reduce the impact of outbreaks should be better than with the traditional 
surveillance systems. Moreover, the PODD surveillance system should successfully 
complete the objective of an up to date surveillance system following the WHO 
definition, which is the “continuous, systematic collection, analysis and interpretation 
of health-related data needed for the planning, implementation, and evaluation of public 
health practice. Such surveillance can serve as an early warning system for impending 
public health emergencies; document the impact of an intervention, or track progress 
towards specified goals; and monitor and clarify the epidemiology of health problems, 
to allow priorities to be set and to inform public health policy and strategies.” (WHO, 
Public health surveillance, 2019). 
The objective of this study is to demonstrate that there are many positive ways in which 
advanced technologies can improve surveillance systems, such as new opportunities for 
integration between the growth of mobile phone networks and health services to create 
eHealth services (Vital Wave Consulting, 2009). Moreover, in the developing world, 
many organizations need effective data collecting to successfully meet their goals, such 
as economic development, food security improvement, and public health accessibility. 
Smartphone growth and technological progress are opportunities to improve the 
weaknesses in the current method of health data collection by using wireless technology 
(Anokwa, Hartung, Brunette, Borriello, & Lerer, 2009). However, the results in this 
study demonstrate that even though the PODD system has used advanced technologies 
to reduce the problem of slowness in the traditional surveillance system, this is not 
enough to reduce the impact of animal diseases on farmers over a period of one year. 
Following the WHO definition, the PODD system cannot successfully improve the 
efficiency of early warning. The PODD system still cannot successfully complete the 
objective of an up to date surveillance system following the WHO definition. 
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The weaknesses in this study are the limitations of livestock and economic data. There 
is only one kind of livestock in this study, which is backyard chickens. Other livestock 
might show a difference result. And, the total variable cost is only one economic 
variable in this economic impact assessment. Other economic variables might be used 
provide more detail, such as farm revenues or fixed costs (in case of renovation for 
animal diseases prevention). This should be improved in the follow up research. 
2) Conclusion  
In conclusion, the reason why there is no impact from the PODD system on farmers 
might be the short period of time of the impact assessment. In comparison with similar 
technology for human health in Thailand, due to the increase of technological capacity 
in Thailand and the disease outbreak hotspots in Southeast Asia, the smartphone 
application DoctorMe was launched in IOS and Android stores in 2001, which aimed 
to increase the participation of Thai people in disease surveillance systems and also 
collect health data. This application has been downloaded by 400,000 users over two 
years and the number of active users per month is 35,000, mostly in Thailand.  
(Susumpow, Pansuwan, Sajda, & Crawley, 2014). The population in Thailand is 64.55 
million in 2003 (World Bank, Population, total - Thailand, 2020). In other words, the 
Doctorme app took two years to access 0.006 percent of the population. Thus, it can be 
concluded from this that the adoption rate of new technology for health in Thailand is 
very low. It is possible that in the period of one year, the digital animal disease 
surveillance systems might be not enough to have an impact on farmers, because the 
system needs more than one year for the technology to be adopted and the impact 
increased.  
In this study, the results demonstrate that the opportunity for animal disease infections 
in the study area is 22%. Following this percentage, it is possible that in the period of 
one year, which was estimated to show the economic impact, there were no animal 
diseases or very few. In the results from farmer interviews in the study area, the farmers 
also reported that they are not affected by animal diseases every year, which correlates 
with the result of this study. This reason supports that the idea that a period of one year 
might be not enough to estimate the impact. So, the short time frame is another 
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weakness in this study. Moreover, it is possible that some success factors might be 
disregarded, such as farmer’s reporting behavior or the motivation of reporters, which 
are discussed in the latter section. 
5.2. Motivation of reporters in digital animal disease surveillance systems 
 1) Discussion  
In this study, we found that on-farm infectious animal diseases should be regarded as a 
major risk. They can cause financial losses and even insolvencies and they can spread 
to other farms and whole regions. With this background, this study focuses on the topic 
of motivation on animal health reporting in relation to the difference between monetary 
and social incentives (non-money). Data from the PODD project was used in this study. 
The initial results indicate that monetary incentive reduced the effort of the volunteers 
in the monetary group after the end of the payment period and in the long-term. On the 
other hand, the social incentive can maintain the effort of the volunteers in the social 
group throughout all periods of time in this study. 
Monetary incentives are a successful means to increase effort as long as the payment is 
still in progress. The results from this study demonstrate that the monetary group had 
higher reporting efforts than the social groups during the payment period (p < 0.05). 
The level of reporting effort of the volunteers in the monetary market responded to the 
compensation they received. However, it was found that after the compensation was 
terminated, the reporting effort of the monetary group showed a decreasing trend (p < 
0. 001), whereas the social groups reported steadier efforts over time (p = 0. 164). For 
all the periods, the effort of the monetary group tended to decline consistently.  
At the 10-month interval after the end of payment, the effort of the monetary group had 
dropped by 73% compared with the payment period (p < 0.001), which was 54% lower 
than in the social group (p < 0.05). This means that when volunteers were forced to 
enter the monetary market, they could no longer return to the social market, even if our 
time frame was 10 months, while the social incentive was able to motivate the social 
group to produce reports during all periods of time without any compensation. 
Monetary incentives not only reduced the effort of the monetary group in the long term, 
but also became an obstacle for their return to a subsequent social market relationship. 
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Overall, it can be concluded that the long-term negative impact of the monetary market 
was that, even if we want the volunteers to return to the social market, it is not easy to 
do so. 
In monetary markets, people lose their motivation when the compensation is not as high 
as their expectation. Using Fiske's 1992 theory, this is equivalent to the changes in 
social relationships, whether CS, AR, or EM, into the MP relationship (Fiske , 1992).  
At the end of the compensation period, it was notable that the efforts of the monetary 
group did not vanish, which is the opposite of the economic standards prediction. The 
atmosphere of social activity may reduce the decline of efforts for a while, but 
eventually it was reduced by the impact of the monetary market. Moreover, after 10 
months of compensation, the social groups had a higher reporting rate than the 
monetary groups. This does not align with the standard economics of the labor model 
(Sandel , 2012). Therefore, it can be concluded that the social activity in this study 
makes the result differ from the other study about social market and monetary market. 
In this study, the reporting effort of the PODD reporter did not lead to individual benefit 
but led to social benefit. For example, in the study of the fine in nurseries, the monetary 
market was used by nurseries to fine the parents who pick up their child later than the 
regulation. In this case, the benefit of payment was directly to the parents, which is 
individual benefit. Parents could pick up their child late as they wanted, because they 
paid for it. That is why later picking up behavior increased after the fines were 
introduced. Eventually, the nurseries stopped fining parents, but the parents’ behavior 
did not change back to the social market in the long-term (Gneezy & Rustichini, 1970). 
However, in the case of the PODD reporter, their reporting effort does not directly 
benefit one person; it benefits   the village or society. Their effort was increasing animal 
disease security not only for farmers in the area, but also the whole society, including 
their families. The differences  between individual and social benefit might explain the 
PODD reporter’s behavior, and why their effort did not disappear immediately after the 
payment was terminated. In other words, the efforts of the PODD reporters were in 
between the social and monetary incentive. 
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The exchange of effort instead of money can maintain the relationship in between social 
markets and monetary markets, but the relationship is more similar to social markets 
(Ariely, 2010). However, in this study, the PODD reporters were directly paid monetary 
incentives for their efforts. This is similar to the payment for animal disease reporting 
services. The efforts of the PODD reporters in this study demonstrate the dynamics of 
effort changing. Even though the behavior of the PODD reporters was more similar to 
social markets in periods 2 and 3, the behavior of the PODD reporters was more similar 
to monetary markets in the long-term.  
The standard labor model of economics cannot be used to explain the behavior of the 
PODD reporters in this study, because the efforts of the reporters did not immediately 
decrease to zero after the payment was terminated, which means that the PODD 
reporters in the monetary group still spent put in effort, even though they received no 
further payment. Moreover, the standard labor model of economics cannot explain that 
why the efforts of the PODD reporters in the social incentive group (no wage) was 
higher than in the monetary group in the long-term. According to the model, when the 
payment or wage is zero, the effort should be zero as well. This study found that 
monetary markets have a negative impact in the long-term (10 months after the 
terminated payment). However, the behavior of the reporters in the monetary market 
cannot be fully explained by the standard labor model of economics or the monetary 
market.  
The results from this study show a different dimension for understanding human 
motivation which is different from the rationality of economic assumption. On the other 
hand, the results confirm that monetary incentives are more influential than social 
incentives. Social incentives cannot be used for a long time after money incentives are 
used (Sandel , 2012 : Gneezy & Rustichini, 1970 : Ariely, 2010). However, there are 
two weaknesses in this study. The first is that the area of study in only in the center of 
Chiang Mai because of the technical limitations. The second is that the number of 
reports per month can represent the quantity of reports but it cannot represent the quality 
of reports. The result cannot demonstrate that the low or high number of reports equates 




2) Conclusion  
From the results, it can be concluded that the monetary markets are useful for 
motivating people in the short-term. Using monetary incentives has the positive effect 
of increasing effort as long as there is still compensation. At the same time, it drives 
people to consider the costs and benefits of their effort, forcing them to think more 
about self- interest rather than social benefits, while the volunteers in the social group 
work for their community without expecting any compensation in return. Moreover, 
from the results of this study, it can be concluded that the behavior of the PODD 
reporters seems to be in between the monetary market and social market because the 
effort after the terminated payment was not zero and not the same level as the social 
market in the long-term. 
In conclusion, it can be expected that over time, volunteers were more motivated to 
work without payment compared with the situation when they receive money at the 
beginning and the payment is terminated later. It has been found that social incentives 
are more efficient than monetary incentives, at least in a sustainability sense. It’s not 
only that they can motivate long-term efforts but also that they remain at a lower cost.  
Nonetheless, the social market is very sensitive and can easily be challenged by the 
monetary market. Likewise, the volunteers’ motivation is quite steady in the long term. 
It is driven by using the social markets rather than the monetary markets in the 
participatory surveillance system. This allows the participatory surveillance system 
developer to understand the whole picture better, especially the part played by the 









5.3 Farmers’ optimistic bias on animal health reporting 
 1) Discussion  
Of the five factors in the model, there are two factors that have no impact on farmers' 
decisions:  farm income and gender.  Farm income as an economic incentive and 
representation of opportunity and transaction cost has no impact on famers’ reporting 
behavior.  Whether farm income is high or low does not make a difference in the 
farmers’ reporting behavior.  It proves that the decisions of farmers are beyond the 
economic factors.  
The economics prediction about adverse selection (asymmetric information) on 
farmers’ reporting did not appear in this study. The prediction of farmers’ behavior, 
that higher fixed cost farmers report less than lower fixed cost farmers (Wolf, 2006) 
cannot be used as an explanation in this study. In other words, the large scale farmers 
with high fixed costs and income did not report less or more than the small scale 
farmers. The farmers do not always calculate their expected cost of reporting or their 
fixed costs. This shows that farmers in Thailand are less rational than the economics 
assumption. Using this assumption to predict Thai farmers’ behavior can lead to 
misunderstandings about their behavior and unsuitable policy making. 
 In addition, the gender factor does not affect the reporting decisions of the farmers. 
This means that whether they are a man or woman, there is no difference in reporting 
behavior.  Gender is not a barrier for farmers’ reporting, which positively relates with 
the result of Cueva, et al (2016). However, the results of the logit model contrast with 
the results of Kristjanson (2010), which report that women are more concerned about 
livestock health than men. And lastly, the number of education years has an effect on 
the reporting decision of the farmer.  This means that more educated farmers report 
about animal diseases on their farm more than less educated farmers. Education systems 
may be the solution for this reporting problem. Moreover, the results demonstrate the 
low impact of farming experience on farmers’ reporting decisions. The result contract 
with Adeogun, et al (2008).  
The results demonstrate that the preventive behavior of farmers is at a high level (80%). 
The results of high preventative behavior refer to the high expected probability of 
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animal disease infection on their farm. On the other hand, the actual probability of 
animal disease infection on their farm is lower than their expectation. That is the reason 
why most of the farmers have no optimistic bias. In this case, it can be concluded that 
the expected risk of the farmer decreases because of the impact of optimistic bias. When 
we calculate the optimistic value in this case, it will be a positive value because the 
actual risk is higher than their expected risk. On the other hand, in the case of a farmer 
who has no optimistic bias, he will have high preventative behaviors because he 
believes that the probability of animal disease infection in his farm equals or is higher 
than for other farmers. In this case, the expected risk of farmers does not decrease by 
the optimistic bias. When we calculate the optimistic value in this case, it will be an 
equal or negative value because the actual risk is equal or lower than their expected 
risk. This indirect method of optimistic bias moderation is the strength of this study. 
However, there are two weaknesses in this study. The first is the limited preventative 
behavior. It is possible that another factor might increase the precision of optimistic 
bias such as the level farm or hygienic standard. The second is the limited information 
of the actual animal disease risk because the official report of animal diseases did not 
represent the actual risk due to lots of lost cases or no reporting to the livestock 
department. 
2) Conclusion  
With an optimistic view, farmers may predict that they can handle the disease or it will 
quickly disappear from their farm they think that they will get more positive events than 
others; they believe that they are luckier farmers than the others. The average value of 
farmers’ optimistic bias is -.58, from which it can be concluded that most of farmers 
have no optimistic bias on their farm about animal diseases. 
From the results of the logit model, it can be concluded that only three variables have 
the impact on famers’ reporting behavior:  optimistic bias, education, and farming 
experience.  This clearly shows that the optimistic bias has a high effect on farmers’ 
reporting behavior. Just a one percent increase of this bias can reduce the probability of 
reporting by 96 percent. This is a higher impact than the other factor that was significant 
in this model. If farmers think that they have a lower risk than others, they do not report 
animal disease on their farm. Moreover, the second variable is farming experience, 
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which has a weekly positive relation to farmers’ reporting. If the number of years of 
farming experience increases, the probability of reporting is increased by 3%. The last 
variable is the number of education years, which also has a weakly positive correlation 
to farmers’ reporting. It can be concluded that if the number of education years 
increases, the probability of reporting increases by 7.5%. On the other hand, the 
livestock income, which should be the main variable for an explanation, has no relation 
to farmers’ reporting. Finally, the gender variable also has no relation to farmers’ 
reporting. 
5.4 General conclusion 
Advanced technology can improve animal disease surveillance systems, which is a 
global threat, by focusing on human behavior as an important success factor for the 
systems. The digital animal disease surveillance system is a powerful instrument for 
reducing the impact of animal diseases and increasing food safety and security. 
However, the advanced technology still needs time to demonstrate the impact and to be 
adopted by users. Moreover, suitable motivation for the reports and awareness of 
farmers’ animal disease reporting behavior cannot be neglected. The impact of the 
system might take longer than one year to appear. In terms of motivation, the monetary 
incentive can increase the effort of report but it comes at a high cost and has a negative 
impact in the long-term. While the social incentive costs less and is more effective in 
the long-term. Where farmers’ animal disease reporting behavior is concerned, the 
optimistic bias is the highest influential factor on the farmers’ reporting decisions, in 
an inverse correlation. An effective digital animal disease surveillance system can save 
not only human but also animal life. Moreover, it can reduce the time taken to control 
the disease and the economic losses. Further research should improve the digital animal 
disease surveillance system, developing a strong instrument for coping with animal 
disease outbreaks in the future. 
 
 




Chapter 6 Policy recommendation and directions for further 
research 
This chapter indicates a policy recommendation and directions for further research. The 
content of this chapter is divided into two parts. The first part contains the policy 
recommendation and benefits of this study, which is the explanation of how to adapt 
the knowledge discovered in this study to make policies, and the benefit of the study on 
the food security issue and the theory of decision making. The second part reflects on 
the limitations and directions for further research, which is the explanation of the 
limitation in each of the main study results and the suggestion for further research to 
fulfill the research gap and limitations of this study. 
6.1 Policy recommendations and benefits of this study 
6.1.1 Policy recommendations 
According to the discussions and conclusions in this study, it is very important for the 
policy makers, government agencies, and surveillance system planners to have a 
holistic view of the surveillance process, which involves many participants. Here are 
some policy recommendations: 
i) In regard to the time period of economic impact, i.e. it might take longer than 
one year for the adoption of a digital animal surveillance system. Advanced 
technology is not the only key to success, but time is still needed to 
demonstrate its impact; 
ii) Awareness of the two kinds of motivation between social and monetary 
incentives. The monetary incentive requires a budget to increase reporters’ 
efforts. When the payment is terminated, the effort will decrease over time 
and, after using a monetary incentive, there cannot be a return to using social 
incentives later. Social incentives should be an effective way to motivate 




iii) Improvement of farmers’ education and farm experience to enhance 
farmers’ animal diseases reporting behavior, such as training for farmers with 
little farming experience and educational support for farmers with a limited 
education; 
iv) In regard to reducing the optimistic bias of farmers, such as by setting up an 
official notification on smartphones about the animal disease situation and 
the probability of infection. 
6.1.2 Benefits and perspectives of this study 
 1) Benefits of the digital surveillance system 
The benefit of this study is not only with respect to digital animal disease surveillance 
systems, but also human disease. This study aims to stimulate farmers to improve the 
digital surveillance system in a holistic way by reporting animal diseases they are 
confronted with using a smartphone application. This study points to the gap in 
behavioral understanding, which is the motivation of the reporters between social and 
monetary incentive, and the impact of the optimistic bias on the farmer’s report 
behavior. The benefit can be adjusted to understand the pandemic problem, such as the 
Coronavirus disease 2019 or COVID-19. Many cases of low preventative behavior 
might be explained by the optimistic bias. The expected risk of COVID-19 infection 
and actual risk could explain the preventative behavior of people and improve the policy 
to better control the diseases. With this perspective, the study of optimistic bias could 
be developed to explore the solution to reduce the impact of the optimistic bias on 
COVID-19 preventative behavior.  
2)  Indirect benefit on food security enchantment  
The benefit of this study is not only directed towards policy makers, but also towards 
increasing food security. The benefit of this study on the food security issue is indirect. 
The direct benefit is the improvement of planning and development of effective digital 
animal disease surveillance systems. An effective surveillance system can lead to the 
reduction of animals lost due to animal diseases and increase of food safety against 
zoonoses. The animal loss reduction effect on food security comes from increasing food 
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supply stability. Moreover, the stability of the food supply can reduce the food price 
variation, which impacts on food security issues in the dimension of food accessibility 
by reducing the shock of food supply decreases. If there are food supply decreases due 
to animal diseases while the food demand remains at the same level, the food prices 
increase because the quantity on the demand side is higher than the quantity on the 
supply side. Food is a necessary product for everyday life. The elasticity of food is very 
low. This means that when the food price increases, the demand of food does not 
change. People still need food to maintain their lives. If we can make food prices more 
stable, this also means that the society can have greater food security, especially poor 
people who have a low income. In addition, with an effective animal disease 
surveillance system, the impact of zoonoses on food products decreases. This means 
the medication costs also decrease. 
  3) The theoretical benefits 
The theoretical benefits, in this study, the results, demonstrate the contrast of the 
mainstream economic assumption, which assumes that people are economically 
rational beings. If reporters or farmers need to make a decision, which is an animal 
disease reporting decision in this study, they always make a decision based on a cost 
and benefit evaluation, and attempt to maximize their utility from the decision they 
made. This study demonstrates that the economically rational assumption cannot be 
solely used to as an explanation for individual behavior in the PODD project. It is rather 
a mixture of human cognitive bias which can be concluded.  
For example, an adverse selection of farmers cannot make a correct prediction of the 
farmers’ report behavior. The high fixed costs farmers did not report less than the low 
fixed cost farmers, even though their economic loss in case of animal disease control is 
higher. Another example, the standard economics of labor cannot explain why the 
PODD reporters still maintained their effort, even when the payment was terminated, 
or why the PODD reporter with social incentives were willing to work with zero wage.  
The results demonstrate that there are other factors beyond maximizing the utility 
approach for making a decision, such as the incentive between social and monetary 
incentive, or the optimistic bias in their decision making. This study supports the 
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argument of behavioral economics, which contrasts with the assumption of 
economically rational beings, to explain the decision making behavior. 
4) Experimental approach improvement 
In addition, this study extended the real situational experiment of behavioral economics 
in the area of the animal disease surveillance system, because the PODD project was 
the pilot project which was arranged in a real situation and not in an experimental setup. 
Participants in the project were real farmers and government agencies. In the concept 
of social and monetary markets, this study demonstrates the middle relationship 
between social and monetary markets because the activity of the animal diseases 
reporting does not benefit the individual as the other previous study, but is social 
beneficial. It can be a new area for understanding more about the monetary and social 
markets, because the social benefit can reduce the effect of monetary markets and 
compromise with the social markets for a while.  
Moreover, in the moderation of the optimistic bias, the indirect calculation of optimistic 
bias was used by through the differentiation of farmer's expected and actual risk. This 
can be of benefit for the future research of optimistic bias, especially in the study area 
of animal disease and reporting behavior, because most of the optimistic bias research 
used the direct method. 
6.2 Limitations and directions for further research 
There are three main limitations in this study: time limitation, technical and budget 
limitation, and data limitation. This section gives an explanation of each limitation and 
the recommendation for future research. 
6.2.1 Time limitation 
The time period of the economic impact assessment is only one year based on the 
available data in the PODD project. It is possible that in 2015 - 2016, which was the 
evaluated the economic impact period of the PODD project, there were no animal 
diseases or outbreaks in the area. Moreover, it is possible that the PODD system needs 
a prolonged observation and data set to demonstrate the economic impact, as in the case 
of the smartphone application of Doctorme. The further research on the economic 
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impact assessment should take this into consideration and set the time period of 
economic assessment for longer than one year. If it is possible to collect the data for 5 
or 10 years, it might show more impact and the impact trend in each year. 
6.2.2 Technical and budget limitation 
This study was designed in the central part of Chiang Mai province because of the 
stability of the mobile signal. Moreover, it was a long-term study of the actual project 
which involves studying the real situation. It involved handling a large budget and the 
PODD project had to run the process on time. We could not find more samples to extend 
the sample size or use systematic sampling in this study. There are some challenges for 
future studies, such as differences in culture or geography, for comparing the impact of 
the social and monetary markets.  
Because of the limitation, in this study, we focus only on the number of reports. Further 
studies could be extended to study the quality of reports in order to gain a greater 
understanding of the effect of monetary and social incentives on participatory 
surveillance systems. Moreover, the amount of monetary incentive might be changed 
to demonstrate the effect of the level of monetary on the effort. On the other hand, social 
incentives might be changed to another kind such as a gift or gratitude from the society 
or government agencies. 
6.2.3 Data limitation 
In this study, the economic impact assessment used only the total variable cost of 
backyard chicken farmers based on the available data on the PODD project. In addition, 
the farmers in this part of the study were a different group. It would be better if further 
research can collect the data from the same farmers in the form of time series data. To 
extend the knowledge, the further research should include more economic variables, 
such as livestock income, fixed costs (in cases of animal disease preventive renovation), 
and profit. Moreover, the impact assessment should be expanded to other kinds of 
livestock such as swine, diary, and beef cattle to study and compare the economic 
impact on other kinds of livestock. Finally, the economic impact in this study focused 
on the farmers’ side. Further research should extend to the consumers’ side or the 
environmental impact in order to estimate the impact on other dimensions. 
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In addition, there was limited preventative behavior data based on the PODD project. 
For the calculation of the expected risk of farmers in this study, four preventative 
behaviors were used (animal disease information update, use of the necessary vaccines, 
livestock health check, and farm cleaning). Further research could add more 
preventative behavior, which is suitable to the situation and area of study, to improve 
the accuracy of the expected risks of farmers, such as the hygienic standard. 
The last data limitation was the actual risk of animal diseases in the study area. The 
official report of animal diseases did not represent the actual risk because of many lost 
cases or no reporting to the livestock department. In this study, the actual risk was 
calculated by the number of infected farmers and the number of all participating 
farmers. Further research could improve the actual risk calculation by data collection 
of all farmers in the area to estimate the actual probability. However, this is associated 
with greater time and budget consumption. In the beginning of this study (2016), there 
was an effort to do this, but the study area was announced to be a foot-and-mouth 
outbreak area. Unfortunately, the data collection of all farmers in the area was 














Zoonotic diseases are a continuously significant threat to global human and livestock 
health (causing millions of deaths yearly). Zoonotic diseases are not only a human 
health threat, but also a threat to animal health and welfare. Moreover, they have a high 
impact on national economies and food security due to productivity and production 
reduction. Expanding worldwide travel and global trade increases the importance of the 
threat of zoonotic diseases. The increase in global meat consumption contrasts with the 
escalating instability of the global meat market, which is affected by the increase of 
livestock densities, changes in production intensity, and slaughtering systems, causing 
animal disease outbreaks to spread widely. This study focuses on the animal disease 
surveillance system in Thailand as an important world meat exporter. In 2014, the 
Participatory One Health Disease Detection project, or PODD was set up by the 
veterinary inspection authorities to test animal epidemic control systems using 
smartphone applications in the Chiang Mai province in northern Thailand  
The main objectives of this study are (i) to evaluate the economic impact of the PODD 
system on farmers by impact assessment (n = 177) (ii) to demonstrate the impact of 
monetary and non-monetary incentives on the PODD reporters by the experimental 
approach (n = 17), (iii) and to present the effect of the socioeconomic factors and 
behavioral bias on farmers’ animal disease reporting behavior with the logit model (n 
= 467). 
Focusing on the first objective, the results of this study concluded that there is an impact 
on the farmers. The technology alone cannot improve animal health security in the 
short-term. In the second objective, the results concluded that, in the case of the PODD 
reporters, the decision of using monetary incentives to motivate most of the PODD 
reporters has a negative impact in the long-term. Losing reporter motivation and effort 
reflected to the low efficiency of the digital surveillance system of PODD and no impact 
on farmers. Concerning In the last objective, the results concluded that the optimistic 
bias of farmers has a very high impact on their decision making about reporting animal 
diseases on their farm. Just one infected farm in the case of dairy milk farmers can 
spread the foot-and-mouth disease to other farms. The new digital animal health 
surveillance system alone is not enough to reduce the impact of animal diseases of 
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farmers. Suitable motivation for the reports and awareness of farmers’ optimistic bias 
in animal disease reporting cannot be neglected in digital animal disease surveillance 
system improvement. 
Overall, it can be concluded that the digital animal disease surveillance system is a 
powerful instrument for reducing the impact of animal diseases and increasing food 
safety and security. However, application of this advanced technology still needs time 
to demonstrate the impact and to be broadly adopted by users. In terms of motivation, 
the monetary incentive can increase the effort of report in the short run but it comes at 
a high cost and has a negative impact in the long-term. While the social incentive costs 
less and is more effective in the long-term. Where farmers’ animal disease reporting 
behavior is concerned, the optimistic bias is the highest influential factor on the 


















Zoonotische Krankheiten stellen eine anhaltend große Bedrohung für die Gesundheit 
von Mensch und Tier dar (sie verursachen jährlich Millionen von Todesfällen). 
Zoonosen stellen nicht nur eine Gefahr für die menschliche Gesundheit dar, sondern 
auch für die Gesundheit und das Wohlergehen der Tiere. Darüber hinaus haben sie 
aufgrund von Produktivitätseinbußen einen hohen Einfluss auf die Volkswirtschaften 
und die Ernährungssicherheit. Der Anstieg des weltweiten Reiseverkehrs und des 
globalen Handels erhöht die Bedeutung der Bedrohung durch Zoonosen. Die Zunahme 
des weltweiten Fleischkonsums steht im Gegensatz zur eskalierenden Instabilität des 
globalen Fleischmarktes, der durch die gesteigerten Viehbestandsdichten, 
Veränderungen der Produktionssyteme und der Schlachtsysteme beeinflusst wird, was 
zu einer weiten Verbreitung von Tierseuchenausbrüchen führt. Diese Studie 
konzentriert sich auf ein Tierseuchenüberwachungssystem in Thailand, einem 
weiltweit wichtigen Fleischexporteur. Im Jahr 2014 wurde von den 
Veterinärinspektionsbehörden das Projekt Participatory One Health Disease Detection 
(PODD) ins Leben gerufen, um Tierseuchenkontrollsysteme mit Smartphone-
Anwendungen in der Provinz Chiang Mai im Norden Thailands zu testen.  
Die Hauptziele dieser Studie sind (i) die Bewertung der wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen 
des PODD-Systems auf die Landwirte durch eine Folgenabschätzung (n = 177), (ii) der 
Nachweis des Einflusses von monetären und nicht-monetären Anreizen auf die PODD-
Berichterstatter durch einen experimentellen Ansatz (n = 17), (iii) und die Darstellung 
des Einflusses der sozioökonomischen Faktoren und Verhaltensverzerrungen auf das 
Meldeverhalten der Landwirte bei Tierseuchen mit dem Logit-Modell (n = 467). 
Gemäß dem erste Ziel kamen die Ergebnisse dieser Studie zu dem Schluss, dass es eines 
Einflusses auf die Landwirte gibt. Die Technologie allein kann die Sicherheit der 
Tiergesundheit kurzfristig nicht verbessern. Bezüglich des zweiten Ziels, konnte 
gefolgert werden, dass die Entscheidung, PODD-Berichterstatter durch monetäre 
Anreize zu motivieren, langfristig negative Auswirkungen hat. Der Verlust der 
Motivation und des Einsatzes der Berichterstatter konnte auf die geringe Effizienz des 
digitalen Überwachungssystems des PODD zurückgeführt werden. Beim letzten Ziels 
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kamen die Ergebnisse zu dem Schluss, dass die optimistische Voreingenommenheit der 
Landwirte einen sehr großen Einfluss auf ihre Entscheidungsfindung bei der Meldung 
von Tierkrankheiten auf ihrem Betrieb hat. Nur ein infizierter Betrieb kann im Falle 
von Milchviehhaltern die Maul- und Klauenseuche auf einen anderen Betrieb 
übertragen. Das neue digitale Tiergesundheitsüberwachungssystem allein reicht dabei 
nicht aus, um die Auswirkungen von Tierkrankheiten der Landwirten zu verringern. 
Bei der Verbesserung des digitalen Tierseuchenüberwachungssystems dürfen die 
Motivation für die Berichterstattung und das Bewusstsein für die optimistische 
Voreingenommenheit der Landwirte bei der Meldung von Tierseuchen nicht 
vernachlässigt werden. 
Insgesamt ist zu schlussfolgern, dass das digitale Tierseuchenüberwachungssystem ein 
wirksames Instrument zur Verringerung der Auswirkungen von Tierseuchen und zur 
Erhöhung der Lebensmittelsicherheit und -sicherheit darstellt. Allerdings wird noch 
Zeit benötigt, bis die Auswirkungen dieser fortschrittlichen Technologie abgeschätzt 
werden können und sie von den Anwendern adoptiert wird. Was die Motivation betrifft, 
kann der monetäre Anreiz die Motivation für die Berichterstattung erhöhen, aber er ist 
mit hohen Kosten verbunden und hat langfristig negative Auswirkungen. Der soziale 
Anreiz kostet hingegen weniger und ist auf lange Sicht wirksamer. Bezüglich des 
Meldeverhaltens der Landwirte auf Tierseuchen, ist die optimistische Verzerrung in 














Aanensen, D. M., Huntley, D. M., Feil, E. J., Al-Own, F., & Spratt, B. G. (2009). 
EpiCollect: Linking smartphones to web applications for epidemiology, 
ecology and community data collection. PLoS ONE, 4(9), e6968. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006968 
Adeogun, O., Ajana, A., Ayinla, O., Yarhere, M., & Adeogun, M. (2008). Application 
of Logit Model in Adoption Decision: A Study of Hybrid Clarias in Lagos State, 
Nigeria. American-Eurasian Journal of Agricultural & Environmental 
Sciences, 4(4), 468-472. 
Animal Health in the World – Overview. (2019). Retrieved from World Organisation 
for Animal Health: http://www.oie.int/animal-health-in-the-world/ 
Anokwa, Y., Hartung, C., Brunette, W., Borriello, G., & Lerer, A. (2009). Open source 
data collection in the developing world. Computer, 42(10), 97-99. 
doi:10.1109/MC.2009.328 
Ariely, D. (2010). Predictably irrational: The hidden forces that shape our decisions. 
New York: Harper Perennial. 
Ariely, D. (2016). Payoff: The Hidden Logic That Shapes Our Motivations. New York: 
Simon & Schuster. 
Bloom, E., de Wit, V., & Carangal San—Jose, M. J. (2005). ERD Policy Brief NO. 42 
: Potential Economic Impact. Manila: Asian Development Bank. 
Brownstein , J. S., Freifeld , C. C., Reis , B. Y., & Mandl , K. D. (2008). Surveillance 
Sans Frontières: Internet-based emerging infectious disease intelligence and the 
HealthMap project. PLoS Med, 5(7), e151. 
Brownstein, J. S., Freifeld, C. C., & Madoff, L. C. (2009). Digital Disease Detection 
— Harnessing the Web for Public Health Surveillance. N Engl J Med, 360(21), 
2153–2157. doi:10.1056/NEJMp0900702 
Brugere, C., Onuigbo, D. M., & Morgan, K. L. (2017). People matter in animal disease 
surveillance: Challenges and opportunities for the aquaculture sector. 
Aquaculture, 467, 158-169. 
Bruinsma, J. (2003). WORLD AGRICULTURE : TOWARDS 2015/2030 AN FAO 
PERSPECTIVE. London, UK: Earthscan Publications Ltd . 
107 
 
Burger, J. M., & Burns, L. (1988). The illusion of unique invulnerability and the use of 
effective contraception. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 14, 264–
270. 
Cambodia Malaria Surveillance System. (n.d.). Retrieved December 20, 2019, from 
InSTEDD: http://ilabsoutheastasia.org/project/cambodia-malaria-surveillance-
system/ 
Chaudhary, A. K. (2013). IMPACT OF BEHAVIORAL FINANCE IN 
INVESTMENT. International journal of management research and business 
strategy, 2(2), 85-92. 
Cheng , M. (2017, May 3). WHO Handbook for Journalists: Influenza Pandemic. World 
Health Organization. Retrieved from World Health Organization: 
http://www.who.int/csr/don/Handbook_influenza_pandemic_dec05.pdf 
Cheng, M. (2005, December 30). WHO Handbook for Journalists: Influenza Pandemic. 
Retrieved from World Health Organization: 
http://www.who.int/csr/don/Handbook_influenza_pandemic_dec05.pdf 
Clement, J. (2018, Febuary 13). Global number of YouTube viewers 2016-2021. 
Retrieved 4 5, 2020, from statista: 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/805656/number-youtube-viewers-
worldwide/ 
Country Report: Thailand. (2019, January). Retrieved from The Quality Assurance 
Agency: https://www.qaa.ac.uk/docs/qaa/international/country-report-thailand-
2019.pdf?sfvrsn=ab3fc081_6 
Crociata, A., Agovino, M., & Sacco, P. L. (2015). Recycling waste: Does culture 
matter? Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 55, 40-47. 
Cueva, C., Iñigo, I.-O., Esther, M.-P., Giovanni, P., Marcello, S., Haihan, Y., & Vita, 
Z. (2016). Cognitive (ir)reflection: New experimental evidence. Journal of 
Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 64, 81-93. 
Cummings, K. M., Becker, M. H., & Maile, M. C. (1980). Bringing the models 
together: An empirical approach to combining variables used to explain health 
actions. Journal ofBehavioral Medicine, 3, 123-145. 
108 
 
Delgado, C., Rosegrant, M., Steinfeld, H., Ehui, S., & Courbois, C. (1999). Livestock 
to 2020: The next food. Washington, DC: IFPRI/FAO/ILRI (International Food 
Policy Research Institute/FAO/International Livestock Research Institute). 
European Commission. (2019, 18 11). AGRI-FOOD TRADE STATISTICAL 
FACTSHEET. Retrieved from European Commission: 
https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/trade-
analysis/statistics/outside-eu/countries/agrifood-thailand_en.pdf 
Eurostat. (2020, June 12). Glossary:Livestock unit (LSU). Retrieved from European 
Commission : https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Glossary:Livestock_unit_(LSU) 
FAO. (2002). Animal diseases: implications for international meat trade. Rome: FAO. 
FAO. (2004). Transboundary Animal Diseases. Assessment of socioeconomic impacts 
and institutional responses. Livestock policy (Livestock Information and Policy 
Branch ed.). (M. J. Otte , R. Nugent , & et al, Eds.) Food and. 
FAO. (2017, October 1). Food Balance Sheets: Meat - Food supply quantity. Retrieved 
from Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations: 
http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FBS 
FAO. (2018, April). Meat Market Review. Retrieved from Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations : http://www.fao.org/economic/est/est-
commodities/meat/meat-and-meat-products-update/en/ 
FAO. (2019, April 24). FAO Agri-Environmental Indicators Update: Livestock 
Patterns. Retrieved from Food and agriculture organization: 
http://www.fao.org/economic/ess/environment/data/livestock-patterns/en/ 
FAO. (2019, March). Meat Market Review . Retrieved from Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations: http://www.fao.org/economic/est/est-
commodities/meat/meat-and-meat-products-update/en/ 
FAO, OIE, & WHO. (2019). Taking a Multisectoral, One Health Approach: A 
Tripartite Guide to Addressing Zoonotic Diseases in Countries. WHO. 
Fiske , A. P. (1992). The four elementary forms of sociality: Framework for a unified 
theory of social relations. Psychological review, 99, 689-723. 
109 
 
Food and Agriculture Organization. (1999). Manual on Livestock Disease Surveillance 
and Information Systems. Retrieved from Food and Agriculture Organization: 
http://www.fao.org/3/x3331e/X3331E00.htm#TOC 
Frey, B. S., & Gallus, J. (2016). Awards as non-monetary incentives. Evidence-based 
HRM, 4(1), 81-91. doi:10.1108/EBHRM-05-2015-0016 
Gneezy, U., & Rustichini, A. (1970). A Fine is a Price. Journal of Legal Studies, 29. 
doi:10.1086/468061 
Graham , M., & Dutton, W. H. (2014). Society and the Internet: How Networks of 
Information and Communication are Changing Our Lives. Oxford Scholarship 
Online. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661992.001.0001 
Harris, A. J., & Hahn, U. (2011). Unrealistic optimism about future. Psychol Rev, 118, 
135–154. 
Helweg-Larsen, M., & Shepperd, J. A. (2001). Do Moderators of the Optimistic Bias 
Affect Personal or Target Risk. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 
5(1), 74–95. 
Helweg-Larsen, M., & Shepperd, J. A. (2001,). Do Moderators of the Optimistic Bias 
Affect Personal or Target Risk Estimates? A Review of the Literature. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 5(1), 74-95. 
Heyman, J., & Ariely, D. (2004). Effort for payment. A tale of two markets. 
Psychological Science, 15(11), 787-93. doi:10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00757.x 
Horby, P., Pfeiffer, D., & & Oshitani, H. (2013). Prospects for Emerging Infections in 
East and Southeast Asia 10 Years after Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome. 
Emerging Infectious Diseases, 19(6), 853-860. doi:10.3201/eid1906.121783. 
Integrating Mobile E-Health into Diabetes Management and Hypertension in 
Cambodia. (n.d.). Retrieved December 19, 2019, from InSTEDD: 
http://ilabsoutheastasia.org/project/integrating-mobile-e-health-into-diabetes-
management-and-hypertension-in-cambodia/ 
Keusch , G. T., Pappaioanou , M., Gonzalez , M. C., Scott , K. A., & Tsai , P. (2009). 
In Global Surveillance and Response to Emerging Zoonotic Diseases. 
Washington, DC: National Academies Press. 
110 
 
Kristjanson, P., Waters-Bayer, A., Johnson, N., Tipilda, A., Njuki, J., Baltenweck, I., . 
. . MacMillan, S. (2010). Livestock and Women’s Livelihoods: A Review of the 
Recent. Discussion Paper No. 20. Nairobi, Kenya: ILRI. 
Larwood, L. (1978). Swine flu: A study of self-serving biases. Journal of Applied Social 
Psychology, 8, 283–289. 
Lieberman, D. (2002). Make Peace with Anyone: Breakthrough Strategies to Quickly 
End Any Conflict, Feud or Estrangement. California: St. Martin's Press. 
Lore, T. (2009). Introduction to Participatory Epidemiology and its Application to 
Highly Pathogenic Avian Infl uenza Participatory Disease Surveillance - A 
Manual for Participatory Disease Surveillance Practitioners. Regal Press 
Kenya Limited. 
Madoff, L. C. (2004). ProMED-mail: an early warning system for emerging diseases. 
Clin Infect Dis, 39, 227–32. doi:PubMed: 15307032 
Madoff, L. C. (2004). ProMED-mail: An Early Warning System for Emerging 
Diseases. International Society for Infectious, 39, 227-232. doi:10.1086/422003 
Madoff, L. C., & Li, A. (2014). Web-based surveillance systems for human, animal, 
and plant diseases. Microbiol Spectrum, 2(1), OH0015-2012. 
doi:10.1128/microbiolspec.OH-0015-2012. 
Maslow, A. (1943). A Theory of Human Motivation. Psychological Review, 50(4), 370-
96. 
McKenna, F. P. (1993). It won’t happen to me: Unrealistic optimism. British Journal 
of Psychology, 84, 39–50. 
Morgan, N., & Prakash, A. (2006). International livestock markets and the impact of 
animal disease. Revue scientifique et technique (International Office of 
Epizootics), 25(2), 517-528. 
Morse, S. S., & et al. (2012). Prediction and prevention of the next pandemic zoonosis. 
Lancet , 380(9857), 1956-1965. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(12)61684-5 
O’Sullivan, O. P. (2015). The Neural Basis of Always Looking on the Bright Side. 
Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences, 8(1), 11-15. 
OIE. (2019, 12 10). FAO, OIE, and WHO launch a guide for countries on taking a One 
Health approach to addressing zoonotic diseases. Retrieved from World 





Our world in data. (2019, October 2). Meat consumption vs. GDP per capita. Retrieved 
from Our world in data: https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/meat-consumption-
vs-gdp-per-capita?time=1990..2013&country=CHN+THA+VNM+MMR 
Our world in data. (2019, October 2). Meat consumption vs. GDP per capita. Retrieved 
from Our World in data: https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/meat-consumption-
vs-gdp-per-
capita?country=USA+CHN+MEX+THA+OWID_WRL+ETH+BGD+AFG 
Our World In Data. (2019, December 10). Meat supply per person. Retrieved from Our 
World In Data: https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/meat-supply-per-
person?tab=chart&time=1961..2013&country=Oceania+Americas+Europe+O
WID_WRL+Asia+Africa 
Paul, M., & et al. (2010). Anthropogenic factors and the risk of highly pathogenic avian 
influenza H5N1. Veterinary Research, 41(3). doi:10.1051/vetres/2009076 
Perloff, L. S., & Fetzer, B. K. (1986). Self-other judgments and perceived vulnerability 
to victimization. Journal of Personality and, 50, 502–510. 
PODD. (n.d.). Retrieved December 10, 2019, from Opendream: 
https://www.opendream.co.th/project/podd 
Rae, A. (1998). The effects of expenditure growth and urbanisation on food 
consumption in East Asia: a note on animal products. Agricultural Economics, 
18(3), 291–299. 
Revell, B. J. (2015). One Man's Meat … 2050? Ruminations on Future Meat Demand 
in the Context of Global Warming. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 66(3), 
573–614. doi:10.1111/1477-9552.12121 
Rushton, J., Viscarra, R., Guerna Bleich, E., & Mcleod, A. (2005). Impact of avian 
influenza outbreaks in the poultry sectors of five South East Asian countries 
(Cambodia, Indonesia,Lao PDR, Thailand, Viet Nam) outbreak costs, responses 
and potential long term control. World’s Poultry Science Journal, 61(3), 491-
514. doi:10.1079/WPS200570 
Sandel , M. (2012). What money can't buy: The moral limits of markets. New York: 
Farrar: Straus and Giroux. 
112 
 
Santini, F., Ronzon, T., Dominguez, I. P., Enciso, S. R., & Proietti, I. (2017). What if 
meat consumption would decrease more than expected in the high-income 
countries? Bio-based and Applied Economics, 6(1), 37-56. doi:10.13128/BAE-
16372 
Sharot, T. (2011). The optimism bias. Current biology, 21(23), r941-r945. 
Sheer, V. C., & Cline, R. J. (1994). he development and validation of a model 
explaining sexual behavior among college students : Implications for AIDS 
communication campaign. Human Communication Research, 21, 280–304. 
Smolinski, M. S., Crawley, A. W., Baltrusaitis, K., Chunara, R., Olsen, J. M., Wójcik, 
O., & et al. (2015). Flu Near You: Crowdsourced Symptom Reporting Spanning 
2 Influenza Seasons. Am J Public Health, 105(10), 2124-2130. 
doi:10.2105/AJPH.2015.302696 
Smolinski, M. S., Crawley, A. W., Olsen, J. M., Jayaraman, T., & Libel, M. (2017). 
Participatory Disease Surveillance: Engaging Communities Directly in 
Reporting, Monitoring, and Responding to Health Threats. JMIR Public Health 
Surveill, 3(4). doi:10.2196/publichealth.7540 
Snyder, C., & Nicholson, W. (2016). Microeconomic Theory Basic Principles and 
Extensions (12 ed.). Boston (MA): Cengage learning . 
Steinfeld, H., Gerber, P., Wassenaar, T. D., Castel, V., Rosales, M., & de Haan, C. 
(2006). Livestock’s Long Shadow: Environmental Issues and Options. Rome, 
Italy: Food & Agriculture Org. 
Susumpow, P., Pansuwan, P., Sajda, N., & Crawley, A. (2014). Participatory disease 
detection through digital volunteerism: how the doctorme application aims to 
capture data for faster disease detection in thailand. the 23rd international 
conference on World wide web companion (pp. 663-666). NY: Association for 
Computing Machinery. doi:10.1145/2567948.2579273 
Tilman, D., Balzer, C., Jason, H., & Befort, B. L. (2011). Global food demand and the 
sustainable intensification of agriculture. Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences of the United States of America, 108(50), 20260-20264. 
doi:10.1073/pnas.1116437108 
Venkiteswaran , G. (2019, December 20). Re-thinking media reform in Southeast Asia: 





Vital Wave Consulting. (2009). mHealth for development: The opportunity of mobile 
technology for healthcare in the developing world. Washington, DC: UN 
Foundation - Vodafone Foundation Partnership. 
Vohs, K. D., Mead, N. L., & Goode, M. R. (2008). Merely activating the concept of 
money changes personal and interpersonal behaviour. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 17(3), 208-212. 
WHO. (2011, April 30). Influenza. Retrieved from World Health Organization: 
https://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/avian_influenza/h5n1
_research/faqs/en/ 
WHO. (2013, February 20). Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework for the 
sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits. 
Retrieved from World Health Organization: 
http://www.who.int/entity/influenza/resources/pip_framework/en/index.html 
WHO. (2017, March 3). Influenza. Retrieved from World Health Organization: 
http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/avian_influenza/h5n1_
research/faqs/en/ 
WHO. (2017). Pandemic Influenza Risk Management: A WHO guide to inform and 
harmonize national and international pandemic preparedness and response. 
Geneva: World Health Organization. 
WHO. (2019, December 3). Public health surveillance. Retrieved from World Health 
Organization: https://www.who.int/topics/public_health_surveillance/en/ 
Wolf, C. (2006), “Livestock Disease Eradication Programs and Farm Incentives: The 
Case of Bovine Tuberculosis in Michigan”, in D. Hoag, S. Koontz and D. 
Thilmany (eds.), The Economics of Livestock Disease Insurance: Concepts, 
Issues and International Case Studies, CABI press, Oxfordshire, UK, pp. 181-
192.   
Wolf, C. A. (2013). Livestock disease indemnity design: considering asymmetric 
information. LIVESTOCK DISEASE POLICIES: BUILDING BRIDGES 
BETWEEN SCIENCE AND ECONOMIES (pp. 127-137). OECD publishing. 
114 
 
World Bank. (2019, 11 18). GDP (current US$) - Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, 
Philippines, Vietnam. Retrieved from The World Bank: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2018&location
s=TH-SG-ID-PH-VN&start=2008&type=points&view=chart 
World Bank. (2020, September 9). Population, total - Thailand. Retrieved from The 
World Bank: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=TH 
World Health Organization. (2006). Communicable disease surveillance and response 




World Organization for Animal Health. (2018). Manual 5: Surveillance and 
Epidemiology. Paris: OIE. 
Yano, T., Phornwisetsirikun, S., Susumpow, P., Visrutaratna, S., Chanachai, K., Phetra, 
P., & et al. (2018). A Participatory System for Preventing Pandemics of Animal 
Origins: Pilot Study of the Participatory One Health Disease Detection (PODD) 




















Name   TossapondKewprasopsak 
Address  104 Moo 5 Tumbon MaeHia 
   Muang, Chiang Mai, Thailand 
   50100 
Email   dhossapond@gmail.com 
Nationality  Thai 
Date of birth  December, 24th 1988 
Phone    +6688 251 9986 
 
Academic education and professional experience 
2007-2011  Bachelor of Sociology and Anthropology, Chiang Mai University, 
Thailand 
2011  Research assistant in the Project of a Communal Irrigation System, 
Farming Productivity and Water Use Efficiency:  The case of 
‘ Muangfai’  in Northern Thailand under responsibility of faculty of 
business, Charles Sturt University 
2012  Research assistant in the Project of Rethinking the Quality Assurance 
in Sociology and Anthropology, Chiang Mai University, Thailand 
2012 - 2013  Research assistant in the Project of Integrated Community- based 
Forest and Catchment / management through an Ecosystem Service 
Approach ( CBFCM)  under responsibility of Thai Pollution Control 
Department and The United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) 
2012 - 2015  Master of Economics, Chiang Mai University, Thailand 
116 
 
2014 - 2015  Research assistant in the Project of One Health Participatory 
Epidemiology: Participatory Animal Health Digital Surveillance–
Effective one health model preventing pandemic at its source, Chiang 
Mai University 
2015 - 2021  Doctorate degree in the PhD program of Global Food Security with 
the major of Behavioral Economics, (Dr. sc. agr), University of 
Hohenheim, Stuttagrt/Germany 
Relevant awards and fellowships 




 Irrational Economic Decision Behavior for Choosing Major in Higher 
Education, MSc. (Econ.), Chiang Mai University 
 
Presentations at academic conference  
2015 Irrational Economic Decision Behavior for Choosing Major in 
Higher Education in the 9th National Conference of Economists, 
Kasetsart University, Thailand, January 11th, 2015 
2017 Approaches of young scientists from FSC, University of Hohenheim 
and the Center for Development Research (ZEF), University of Bonn 
in World Food Day Colloquim 2017, University of Hohenheim, 










Declaration in lieu of an oath on independent work 
according to Sec. 18(3) sentence 5 of the University of Hohenheim’s Doctoral 
Regulations for the Faculties of Agricultural Sciences, Natural Sciences, and 
Business, 
Economics and Social Sciences 
1. The dissertation submitted on the topic 
Behavioral Economic Impact on Animal Health Surveillance System in Thailand  
is work done independently by me. 
2. I only used the sources and aids listed and did not make use of any impermissible 
assistance from third parties. In particular, I marked all content taken word-for-word 
or paraphrased from other works. 
3. I did not use the assistance of a commercial doctoral placement or advising agency. 
4. I am aware of the importance of the declaration in lieu of oath and the criminal 
consequences of false or incomplete declarations in lieu of oath. 
I confirm that the declaration above is correct. I declare in lieu of oath that I have 









Stuttgart, November 2020    Tossapond Kewprasopsak 
